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TAX PROTEST, “A HOMOSEXUAL,” AND FRIVOLITY: 
A DECONSTRUCTIONIST MEDITATION 
ANTHONY C. INFANTI* 
“Even though a state may recognize a union of two people of the same sex as a 
legal marriage for the purposes within that state’s authority, that recognition 
has no effect for purposes of federal law.  A taxpayer in such a relationship 
may not claim the status of a married person on the federal income tax return.” 
—The Internal Revenue Service1 
“I submit that an individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is 
unjust, and willingly accepts the penalty by staying in jail in order to arouse 
the conscience of the community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the 
very highest respect for law.” 
—Martin Luther King, Jr.2 
When I was approached about making a contribution to this symposium, 
Out of the Closet and into the Light: The Legal Issues of Sexual Orientation, I 
was told that it had been inspired by the recent momentous developments in 
gay rights.3  Sadly, however, I worried that a contribution discussing tax issues 
relating to sexual orientation would provide too stark a contrast to the themes 
of openness and freedom suggested by the title of the symposium.  I was afraid 
that any contribution that I might make would be too somber because tax is an 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.  I would like to thank 
Alice Abreu, Dorothy Brown, and Leandra Lederman for their helpful comments on an earlier 
draft of this essay.  I would also like to thank Hien Ma for his love and support while I was 
researching and writing this essay. 
 1.  Letter from the Internal Revenue Service to Eugene A. Delgaudio, President, Public 
Advocate of the United States, Inc. (June 14, 2004), http://www.publicadvocateusa.org/news/ 
article.php?article=95 (last visited July 28, 2004) [hereinafter Letter from IRS to Delgaudio].  For 
reporting on the letter, see Allen Kenney, IRS: Joint Filing Not Allowed for Same-Sex Married 
Couples, 103 TAX NOTES 1466, 1466 (2004). 
 2. THE COLUMBIA WORLD OF QUOTATIONS (Robert Andrews et al. eds., 1996), available 
at http://www.bartleby.com (quotation No. 32710) (last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
 3.  In particular, the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003), striking down Texas’ sodomy law, and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
decision in Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), legalizing same-
sex marriage in that state. 
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area where gay and lesbian issues generally remain shrouded in darkness, 
forcibly banished to the invisibility of the closet.4 
Indeed, shortly after I began working on this essay, the Internal Revenue 
Service (“IRS”) reaffirmed the invisibility of gay and lesbian couples for U.S. 
federal tax purposes in a response to a letter from a conservative, “pro-family” 
organization that opposes same-sex marriage.5  Following President Bush’s 
 
 4.  See Anthony C. Infanti, The Internal Revenue Code as Sodomy Statute, 44 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 763, 764 (2004) (noting that the contributors to a 1998 symposium on critical tax 
theory “primarily focused their attention on critical tax scholarship exploring issues relating to 
race and gender” and that only one contributor focused a “significant amount of attention on 
scholarship exploring issues relating to sexual orientation”); id. at 782 (“Thus, not satisfied that a 
mere slap in the face would keep gay and lesbian couples in the tax closet, Congress apparently 
decided to deal them a body blow [(by enacting the Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No 104-
199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000))], that would ensure that 
its hostility is clear and unmistakable.”); id. at 789 (“Their task is not made any easier by 
Congress or the Internal Revenue Service . . . , both of whom have been conspicuously silent on 
the question of how the tax laws should be applied to gay and lesbian couples.”); Nancy J. 
Knauer, Heteronormativity and Federal Tax Policy, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 129, 134–35 (1998) 
(“Critical tax scholarship has made great strides in bringing new perspectives to bear on issues of 
tax policy.  Surprisingly absent from this progressive critique has been any extended discussion 
of the heterosexual bias imbedded in the numerous tax provisions that reference a taxpayer’s 
marital status.  This relative silence on matters of sexual orientation reinforces the 
heteronormative nature of the federal tax code and necessarily limits the depth of any analysis of 
the marital provisions.”) (footnote omitted—in the omitted footnote, Knauer cites the work of 
Patricia Cain as “a noted exception” to the general lack of discussion of gay and lesbian issues in 
critical tax scholarship). 
  This silence on gay and lesbian issues contributes, in part, to the anachronistic and 
myopic feel of tax.  See Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, Or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up 
To Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 518 (1994).  As Michael Livingston has noted: 
If tax scholarship lags behind developments in economics and other social sciences, it is 
also frequently behind the curve within the legal academy.  With its emphasis on 
neutrality as a policy goal, and its faith in analogical reasoning, tax scholarship recalls the 
world of the 1950s, when most legal scholars produced essentially doctrinal work and a 
broad political consensus prevailed throughout the law schools.  The world has changed, 
but tax has remained behind, resulting in a scholarship that is frequently quaint and 
isolated even by law school standards.  In particular, the apolitical nature of tax 
scholarship, while responsible for much of the coherence and majesty of the field, seems 
increasingly out of touch with the remainder of the academy. 
Michael A. Livingston, Reinventing Tax Scholarship: Lawyers, Economists, and the Role of the 
Legal Academy, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 365, 383–84 (1998) (footnote omitted). 
 5.  The organization, Public Advocate of the United States, Inc., describes itself in the 
following terms: 
Since its founding in 1981, Public Advocate has grown into a dedicated group of young 
conservatives in Washington, D.C., with a network of volunteers and supporters 
nationwide. Our continuous growth over the years is due to the fact that we have never 
wavered from our firm conviction that political decisions should begin and end with the 
best interests of American families and communities in mind.  In recent years, our efforts 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2005] TAX PROTEST, “A HOMOSEXUAL,” AND FRIVOLITY 23 
 
endorsement of a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage,6 this organization 
wrote the Commissioner of the IRS to alert him about “a potential fraudulent 
tax scheme.”7  The organization was alarmed by “rebellious state and local 
officials reportedly permitting persons of the same sex to marry in flagrant 
disobedience of applicable laws defining marriage as a union between a male 
and a female,” and was further alarmed by the prospect that these “married” 
same-sex couples (their quotes, not mine) might attempt to file joint federal 
income tax returns.8  The organization urged the Commissioner to deter these 
individuals from attempting to evade income tax by threatening to investigate 
and prosecute any same-sex couples who attempt to file joint returns.9  An 
excerpt from the IRS response to this letter serves as the first epigraph to this 
essay.  In that excerpt, the IRS reassures the conservative organization that 
same-sex couples legally married under state law “may not claim the status of 
a married person on the federal income tax return.”10 
This disturbing correspondence only reinforced the impression left on me 
by a set of cases that immediately came to mind when I learned of the topic of 
this symposium.  As we will see, these cases11 partially (in both senses of the 
 
have focused on supporting: A federal marriage amendment to the Constitution and an 
end to lawful same sex marriage; . . . [t]he promotion of the Boy Scouts. . .; [t]ax cuts and 
the exposure of wasteful “pork barrel” spending for the benefit of liberal special interests. 
PUBLIC ADVOCATE OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLIC ADVOCATE: WHERE THE DEFENSE OF 
AMERICA’S TRADITIONAL FAMILY VALUES BEGINS, at http://www.publicadvocateusa.org/ (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
 6.   President Bush announced his support for a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage 
after the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court issued a decision legalizing same-sex marriage in 
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003), and the City of San Francisco began 
to issue marriage licenses to a deluge of same-sex couples.  See Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Backs 
Ban in Constitution on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at A1; Dean E. Murphy, San 
Francisco Forced to Halt Gay Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2004, at A1 (stating that the City 
of San Francisco issued more than 4100 marriage licenses to same-sex couples before the 
California Supreme Court ordered it to cease issuing such licenses, and that an additional 2600 
couples had made appointments for a license before the order was issued).  The marriage licenses 
issued by the City of San Francisco to these same-sex couples were recently invalidated by the 
California Supreme Court.  Dean Murphy, California Court Rules Gay Unions Have No 
Standing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2004, at A2. 
 7. Letter from Eugene A. Delgaudio, President, Public Advocate of the United States, Inc., 
to Mark W. Everson, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Internal Revenue Service (Apr. 13, 
2004), http://www.publicadvocateusa.org/news/article.php?article=89 (last visited Nov. 17, 
2004). 
 8. Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Letter from IRS to Delgaudio, supra note 1. 
 11.  United States v. Mueller, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,205 (7th Cir. 2000); 
Mueller v. Comm’r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 764 (2001), aff’d, 2002-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,505 
(7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1003 (2002); Mueller v. Comm’r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1887 
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word) recount the story of Robert Mueller, a gay man and “tax protester” 
whose story appears to have gone largely unnoticed by academics.12  After 
much thought, and despite my worries and fears, I decided that a retelling and 
pondering of Mueller’s story would serve as a particularly appropriate 
contribution to this symposium because his story not only provides a 
compelling illustration of the forcible closeting of gay and lesbian issues in tax, 
but also points us in the direction of the next front in the battle for gay rights—
a battle that may just allow us to kick the tax closet door open and finally let in 
the light. 
I.  TAX PROTEST 
Before we can begin Mueller’s story, a bit of a digression is necessary.  In 
describing Mueller above, I referred to him as a gay man and a “tax protester.”  
Apparently, I no longer need to worry about adversely affecting your views of 
Mueller by referring to him as a gay man;13 however, I am concerned that 
labeling Mueller a “tax protester” may have tainted your view of him even 
before I have begun a retelling of his story.  In fact, out of this concern, I have 
until now placed this label in quotation marks in the hope that you will resist 
the temptation to allow these words to conjure in your mind the associations 
that they normally evoke when you hear or read them.  So, for the next several 
 
(2000), aff’d, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,391 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 887 
(2001). 
 12.  I came across a handful of articles citing Mueller’s tax cases, but none of them discusses 
his story in any depth.  See Michael T. Morley et al., Emerging Issues in Family Law, 21 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 169, 194 n.200 (2003); Sarah A. Shubert, Comment, Immigration Rights for Same-
Sex Partners Under the Permanent Partners Immigration Act, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 541, 544 n.29, 
550 n.89, 559 n.181, 563 n.214, 566–67 (2001); Burgess J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, Tax 
Problems of Cohabiting Clients, 102 TAX NOTES 1635 (2004).  In an unscientific survey of the 
federal income tax casebooks in my office, I only encountered two that include references to 
Mueller’s tax cases.  MICHAEL A. LIVINGSTON, TAXATION: LAW, PLANNING, AND POLICY 618–
23 (2003); PAUL R. MCDANIEL ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 
973–76 (5th ed. 2004). 
 13.  See Albright v. Morton, 321 F.Supp.2d 130, 132 (D. Mass. 2004) (“In 2004, a statement 
implying that an individual is a homosexual is hardly capable of a defamatory meaning.”); see 
also Jay Blotcher, Gay Libelous No More?, ADVOC., July 6, 2004, at 15 (reporting on Albright).  
Mueller himself noted this in his petitions for writ of certiorari filed with the U.S. Supreme Court.  
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *11, Mueller v. Comm’r, 2002 WL 32135138 (No. 02-513) 
(“Judge Pajak in his decision states ‘(petitioner) is homosexual.’  The Petitioner has been so 
identified by many federal courts, being no stranger in challenging the stance of the federal 
government to this group.  Twenty years ago this would have been a demeaning accusation.  
Through the evolution of society, that means only that petitioner has standing.”); Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari at *10, Mueller v. Comm’r, 2001 WL 34115848 (No. 01-44) (“Judge Laro in his 
decision states ‘Petitioner is homosexual.’  Twenty years ago this would have been a demeaning 
accusation.  Through the evolution of society, that means only that petitioner has standing.”). 
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pages, please do me the favor of holding this label in abeyance in your mind, 
and allow me to explain why Mueller is not your conventional tax protester. 
A. The Stigma 
When you read the words “tax protester,” they probably conjured in your 
mind the image of a crackpot, deadbeat, or charlatan (and, if they did not, I am 
afraid that I have just now conjured this image for you).14  So tainted is the 
label that Congress has prohibited the IRS from referring to anyone as an 
“illegal tax protester” or “any similar designation.”15  As explained by the 
 
 14.  E.g., Susan Clary, IRS Says Dentist Evaded Taxes, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 21, 1999, 
at D3; Terry Horne, Man Loses Home, Freedom for Skipping Taxes, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Oct. 3, 
2000, at B1; David Cay Johnston, U.S. Warns Businesses on Tax Protest, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 
2001, at C1; Thomas Korosec, Businessman Gets 7-Year Term for Tax Protest, HOUS. CHRON., 
May 1, 2004, at A33; Torsten Ove, Jurors Hear of Tax Protest: IRS Says Failure to Pay 
Deliberate, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 19, 2002, at A13; Liz Pulliam Weston, Money Talk: The 
Federal Government Is Not Amused by Tax Protests, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002, at C3; Tom 
Zeller, These Artful Dodgers Doth Protest Too Much, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2001, § 4, at 5; see 
David Lupi-Sher, Antitax Promoters: A Close-Knit Group Preying on the Gullible, 85 TAX 
NOTES 1129, 1130 (1999) (describing a loose affiliation of extreme right-wing organizations as 
the most important group of tax protesters during the last three decades); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, 
For God and Country: Taxing Conscience, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 939, 942 [hereinafter Kornhauser, 
Taxing Conscience] (referring to this group as “[s]tandard tax protesters”); Marjorie E. 
Kornhauser, Not All Tax Protestors are Cheats and Crooks, 85 TAX NOTES 1469, 1469 (1999) 
[hereinafter Kornhauser, Cheats and Crooks] (responding to Lupi-Sher’s article, but 
acknowledging that the group of extreme right-wing tax protesters “may be more important 
numerically”); ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, EXTREMISM IN AMERICA: TAX PROTEST 
MOVEMENT, at http://www.adl.org/Learn/Ext_US/TPM.asp (last visited Sept. 22, 2004) (“The 
tax protest movement, originating in the 1950s and 1960s, is the oldest right-wing anti-
government movement still in existence in the United States and one of the most active.  Along 
with the better-known militia and sovereign citizen movements, the tax protest movement is a key 
component of the strain of extreme right-wing anti-government activism often referred to as the 
‘patriot’ movement.”); FIN. & TAX FRAUD EDUC. ASSOC., INC., QUATLOOS! SCAMS & FRAUDS 
EXPOSED: TAX PROTESTORS, at http://www.quatloos.com/Tax_Protestors_Page.htm (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2004). 
 15. (a) PROHIBITION. – The officers and employees of the Internal Revenue Service – 
(1) shall not designate taxpayers as illegal tax protestors (or any similar 
designation); and 
(2) in the case of any such designation made on or before the date of the 
enactment of this Act— 
(A) shall remove such designation from the individual master file; and 
(B) shall disregard any such designation not located in the individual master 
file. 
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3707, 
112 Stat. 685, 778 (1998); I.R.C. § 6651 note (West 1998) (Illegal Protestor Designation).  As 
Leandra Lederman so helpfully pointed out to me, the use of the adjective “illegal” before the 
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Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, who is charged with 
monitoring compliance with this prohibition,16 “[t]he Congress had concerns 
that some taxpayers were being permanently labeled and stigmatized by the 
[illegal tax protester] designation.”17 
That a stigma is attached to the “tax protester” label may seem odd, given 
that tax revolts and rebellions have played an important role in the history of 
the United States.18  The Boston Tea Party, Shays’ Rebellion, the Whiskey 
Rebellion, and Fries’ Rebellion were all tax protests.19  Indeed, the Boston Tea 
Party and its protest of “taxation without representation” have become iconic 
symbols in the United States.20  For example, to protest its lack of 
 
label “tax protester” here seems to imply the existence of “legal” tax protest.  What, however, 
would “legal” tax protest look like? 
 16.  I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(A)(v) (West 2004). 
 17.  TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., DEP’T OF TREASURY, FISCAL YEAR 
2004 STATUTORY AUDIT OF COMPLIANCE WITH LEGAL GUIDELINES PROHIBITING THE USE OF 
ILLEGAL TAX PROTESTER AND SIMILAR DESIGNATIONS 1, at http://www.ustreas.gov/tigta/ 
2004reports/200440109fr.html (last visited July 28, 2004). 
 18.   
In the United States, anti-tax sentiments, along with anti-government sentiments 
generally, are an intrinsic aspect of American patriotism and national character . . . 
Americans celebrate their patriotism and commitment to liberty through resistance—often 
violent resistance—to taxes . . . . This patriotic aversion to taxes helps explain why 
Americans vociferously complain about over-taxation despite the fact that they are one of 
the least taxed developed nations. 
  Given the centrality of tax rebellions in America’s history, it is not surprising that tax 
rhetoric in the United States is frequent—and frequently heated.  It is inextricably 
intertwined with America’s conception of democracy, often serving as a “lightening rod” 
[sic] for politics. 
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Legitimacy and the Right of Revolution: The Role of Tax Protests and 
Anti-Tax Rhetoric in America, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 819, 824 (2002) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter 
Kornhauser, Anti-Tax Rhetoric]; see also Christopher S. Jackson, The Inane Gospel of Tax 
Protest: Resist Rendering unto Caesar—Whatever His Demands, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 294 
(1997) (“[Justice-based] [t]ax protesters view themselves as patriots following the standards set 
by our forefathers.”); Kirk J. Stark, The Right to Vote on Taxes, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 191 
(2001) (“One cannot study American history for long before noticing the conspicuous role of tax 
revolts.  Time and again Americans have turned mutinous against taxes—the Boston Tea Party, 
the Whisky Rebellion, the Depression-era tax strikes.  ‘Tax revolts,’ as one commentator put it, 
‘are as American as 1776.’” (quoting Joseph D. Ried, Jr., Tax Revolts in Historical Perspective, 
32 NAT’L TAX J. 67, 69 (1979)) (footnotes omitted); Lupi-Sher, supra note 14, at 1130 (“These 
promoters like to refer to themselves as this generation’s ‘Founding Fathers,’ rebelling against a 
tyrannical government.  And they are more than willing to share their proprietary information in 
exchange for money.  Through seminars and conferences, the promoters advertise their wares.  
They constantly seek funds to defeat the U.S. government.”). 
 19.  See Kornhauser, Anti-Tax Rhetoric, supra note 18, at 840–51; Stark, supra note 18, at 
191. 
 20. See BENJAMIN WOODS LABAREE, THE BOSTON TEA PARTY, at vi (1964). 
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representation in Congress, the District of Columbia (“D.C.”) allows its 
residents to purchase license plates emblazoned with this slogan,21 and D.C.’s 
delegates to the 2004 Democratic National Convention replicated the original 
protest by dumping tea into Boston Harbor.22  Yet, despite the storied role of 
tax rebellion in U.S. history, it seems that the phrase “tax protester” has come 
to be associated with an assortment of crackpots, deadbeats, and charlatans 
who wish to tap into this nostalgia in order to legitimize (i) their assault on 
government and its ability to impose taxes, (ii) their desire simply to avoid 
parting with their money, or (iii) their exploitation of individuals who fall into 
one or both of the latter two groups.23 
1. Crackpots 
The individuals in the first of these three groups may be sincere in their 
beliefs, but they are generally viewed as fringe elements of society who are 
trying to make a statement about the nature of government: 
  There are a variety of direct tax protests ranging from not paying taxes, to 
threatening IRS personnel to actual physical violence against IRS property or 
personnel.  Motivation for these protests range [sic] from frustration to a 
sincere belief that the income tax itself is illegal.  Some individuals act alone; 
others are part of semi-organized movements.  Many of these tax protesters are 
members or adherents of radical right wing groups such as the Posse 
Comitatus, Christian Identity, Sovereign Citizens, the common-law movement, 
the militia movement, and the Patriot movement.  Some of these are violent; 
others not.  All, however, hold similar views about the size and role of 
government and its potential for corruption, including a commonly held belief 
that any government beyond the county level is illegitimate and must be 
resisted.  The more extreme groups often form isolated communities complete 
with their own governments, and feel justified in resisting the illegitimate laws 
of unconstitutional state and federal governments, using arms if necessary.  
These radical protestors believe that it is they who are the true patriots, trying 
to return the country to its authentic nature.24 
 
 21.  DIST. OF COLUMBIA, DEPT. OF MOTOR VEHICLES: ‘TAXATION WITHOUT 
REPRESENTATION’ TAGS, at http://dmv.dc.gov/serv/plates/tax.shtm (last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
 22.  Brian MacQuarrie & Bryan Bender, For D.C. Delegates, a Modern Tea Party, BOSTON 
GLOBE, July 27, 2004, at C4. 
 23.  See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 24.  Kornhauser, Anti-Tax Rhetoric, supra note 18, at 919 (footnotes omitted). 
Moreover, some of the protests also contain an element present in other historic tax 
protests: a complaint not merely against the current form of the income tax or the income 
tax itself, but against the justness of all tax and against the right of the government to 
impose it.  In other words, these protests concern the nature of the government which in 
some instances rises to the level of questioning the legitimacy of the government itself.  
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2. Deadbeats 
Those in the second group are less principled in their protest; they just do 
not seem to like the idea of being told what to do with their money.25  How 
else would you describe individuals who buy expensive tax protester books, 
videos, and other products in an effort to avoid the payment of taxes?  
Consider, for example, those who would purchase a “pure trust” costing as 
much as $1,000 or an “Untax Package” costing as much as $2,500, along with 
those who would even buy letters (at $50 each) to send to the IRS when 
contacted about their “avoided” tax liabilities.26 
3. Charlatans 
The last group promotes or foments tax protest by selling ideas and 
arguments that no tax lawyer would sanction, exploiting and profiting from the 
first group’s distrust of government and the second group’s naïveté.27  The 
ideas and arguments that they peddle (for example, the Sixteenth Amendment 
was not properly ratified, Federal Reserve Notes are not legal tender, only 
 
Tax is merely one battlefield in the struggle to define the political structure of the 
government. 
Id. at 906–07; see also Jackson, supra note 18, at 293–95 (making a distinction between those 
who engage in tax protest for individual gain and those who engage in tax protest because they 
are dissatisfied with government); Kornhauser, Taxing Conscience, supra note 14, at 942–43 
(“Standard tax protesters . . . refuse to pay tax because they resent having to pay so much tax, 
because they oppose the concept of the State in principle, or because they oppose the particular 
government.”); Lupi-Sher, supra note 14, at 1130 (“The second and more important tax protest 
group is mostly found in loosely affiliated extreme right-wing organizations.  This group claims 
that—based on interpretations of the U.S. Constitution and the Internal Revenue Code—people 
do not have to pay income taxes.”). 
 25.   Jackson, supra note 18, at 293–95 (making a distinction between those who engage in 
tax protest for individual gain and those who engage in tax protest because they are dissatisfied 
with government); Kornhauser, Taxing Conscience, supra note 14, at 942–43 (“Standard tax 
protesters . . . refuse to pay tax because they resent having to pay so much tax, because they 
oppose the concept of the State in principle, or because they oppose the particular government.”); 
Kornhauser, Anti-Tax Rhetoric, supra note 18, at 819 (“‘Do you know what it’s called when 
someone else controls the fruits of your labor.  It is tax slavery by the government.’” (quoting 
Alan Keyes, candidate for the Republican presidential nomination in 2000)); id. at 821–22 (“Most 
people never pay their taxes voluntarily, in the ordinary sense of the word.  Rather, they are 
generally anti-tax, in that they usually would prefer to keep any income they receive than pay it to 
the government in taxes.”). 
 26.  See Helen Huntley, Anti-Tax Groups Hit Their Stride, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 24, 
1996, at 1H; David Cay Johnston, The Anti-Tax Man Cometh, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1995, at D1; 
Kathy M. Kristof, Ex-IRS Man Declares Himself Tax-Exempt, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2004, at C1; 
Janet Novak, Protesters?  What Protesters?, FORBES, Mar. 5, 2001, at 126; David Rosenzweig, 
Author, Associates Guilty in Tax-Avoidance Scheme, L.A.TIMES, May 4, 2004, at B5; ANTI-
DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 14. 
 27.  Lupi-Sher, supra note 14, at 1130–34; ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 14. 
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foreign source income is taxable, or claiming to be a citizen of a given state 
and not a citizen of the United States)28 are so wooden and torturous that they 
make the hypertextualist drafters of the now ubiquitous corporate tax shelters 
seem like purposivists or Eskridgean dynamists.29  The intent of these 
arguments is to undermine (and, in some cases, to annihilate)30 the authority of 
the government to enact or impose the income tax (or any other tax).31 
B. Avoiding the Stigma 
However, as Marjorie Kornhauser has so forcefully pointed out, not all tax 
protesters can be characterized as crackpots, deadbeats, or charlatans.32  There 
are others who do not readily come to mind when you hear or read the words 
“tax protester,” but who clearly fall within the ambit of that term.  What these 
individuals have in common, and what distinguishes them from the crackpots, 
the deadbeats, and the charlatans, is that they acknowledge the legitimacy of 
the taxes (particularly the income tax) enacted by Congress.33 
 
 28. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., THE TRUTH ABOUT FRIVOLOUS TAX ARGUMENTS 12–16, 
24–25, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/friv_tax.pdf (last visited July 28, 2004); Jackson, 
supra note 18, at 301, 310–11, 316–17. 
 29.  Purposivism and Eskridgean dynamism are two approaches to statutory interpretation.  
Purposivists argue that, when interpreting individual provisions within a statutory framework, the 
meaning or application of the provisions should be determined by looking to the purpose or 
structure of the statute as a whole.  See Deborah A. Geier, Interpreting Tax Legislation: The Role 
of Purpose, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 492 passim (1995); see also Michael Livingston, Practical Reason, 
“Purposivism,” and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 51 TAX L. REV. 677 passim (1996) 
(discussing Geier’s purposivism).  In contrast, the dynamic approach to statutory interpretation 
described by William Eskridge takes into account “present societal, political, and legal context” 
when interpreting a statute.  William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1479, 1479, 1482–98 (1987).  In the tax literature, Michael Livingston has advocated 
the adoption of Eskridge’s dynamic approach to statutory interpretation (which Livingston refers 
to as a “practical reason” approach).  Livingston, supra, at 720–24. 
 30.  Kornhauser, Anti-Tax Rhetoric, supra note 18, at 823 (“From a practical standpoint, 
successful anti-tax rhetoric increases non-compliance with tax laws which in turn can endanger 
the existence of the state by strangling its means of support.”); id. at 826–27 (“In its most extreme 
form the [anti-tax] rhetoric often appears to attack not just the current income tax or the particular 
politics of the party in power, but tax and government more generally.”). 
 31.  The IRS has on its website a fifty-four page document debunking the most common 
arguments directed against the income tax.  See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 
28; see also Jackson, supra note 18, at 300–21 (listing and briefly responding to a number of 
these arguments). 
 32.  Kornhauser, Cheats and Crooks, supra note 14; see also Kornhauser, Anti-Tax Rhetoric, 
supra note 18, at 824–25, 828, 842–49, 860–61, 867; Kornhauser, Taxing Conscience, supra note 
14, at 940–45, 1015–16. 
 33.  See Kornhauser, Taxing Conscience, supra note 14, at 960 (“War tax resisters’ legal 
challenges to the income tax differ from those of other tax protesters.  In contrast to the others, 
conscientious objectors rarely claim that the income tax is unconstitutional or otherwise legally 
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1. Non-Tax Protest 
Some of these people use the tax system as a vehicle for non-tax protest.  
Most prominently, this group includes pacifists who, for religious, moral, or 
ethical reasons,34 do not wish to support war—either directly (through military 
service) or indirectly (through financial support).35  These war tax protesters 
frequently “seek no personal gain from not paying their taxes because they 
either put their tax money in escrow or donate it to peace-promoting 
organizations.”36  Some have advocated accommodating this form of tax 
protest through the creation of a peace tax fund to which war tax protesters 
could direct their tax payments and the proceeds of which would only be used 
to defray the cost of non-military activities of the government.37  As a result of 
the preemptive war on Iraq in 2003, interest in war tax protest has recently 
increased.38 
 
illegitimate.”); Colleen M. Garrity, Note, The Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act: Becoming 
Conscious of the Need to Accommodate Conscience, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1229, 1229 (2003) 
(“Conscientious objectors to tax, unlike other tax protestors, generally accept the legal legitimacy 
of the income tax.”). 
 34.  Kornhauser, Taxing Conscience, supra note 14, at 950 (“Over the years, however, the 
Court has broadly interpreted the religious exemption in the draft laws to cover an individual 
whose belief is not only religious, but also moral and ethical . . . . This broad interpretation is in 
keeping with an expansion of conscientious objection in western countries, which today largely 
stems from secular rather than religious beliefs.”) (footnotes omitted); id. at 987 (“[T]he purpose 
and intended effect [of the peace tax fund bills] has remained the same: to allow taxpayers who 
are conscientious objectors to pay their taxes without violating their moral, ethical, and religious 
beliefs.”); Garrity, supra note 33, at 1239 (“Despite its apparent plain meaning, the Supreme 
Court has ruled that the Act’s exemption applies to both religious and secular conscientious 
objectors.”). 
 35.  Kornhauser, Taxing Conscience, supra note 14, passim. 
 36.  Id. at 943–44.  War tax protesters are a varied group and engage in different strategies to 
resist financially supporting the military.  These strategies include, among others: making 
“contributions to religious, charitable, and peace organizations”; “living below the taxable income 
level”; “joining or forming a support group”; “supporting war tax resistance of others by 
contributing to a tax resisters’ penalty fund”; “paying federal income taxes but writing ‘paid 
under protest’ on the form”; and “paying the tax due but with a check made out to the Department 
of Health and Human Services.”  Id. at 956–57; see also Garrity, supra note 33, at 1241 
(“Conscientious objectors voice their discontent with this use of tax dollars to fund the military in 
a multitude of ways.”). 
 37.  Kornhauser, Taxing Conscience, supra note 14, at 982–1015; Garrity, supra note 33, at 
1244–62; Kornhauser, Cheats and Crooks, supra note 14.  The first peace tax fund bill was 
introduced in Congress in 1958.  Garrity, supra note 33, at 1244.  Others are not, however, quite 
so approving of war tax resisters and consider them to be lawbreakers.  Sheldon S. Cohen, 
“Good” Protesters Are Still Lawbreakers, 86 TAX NOTES 127, 127 (2000). 
 38.  E.g., Jim Getz, 30-Year Tax Resister Will Refuse to Pay Again, Protesting War in Iraq; 
Not All Are Prosecuted, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 15, 2003, at B3; Roselyn Tantraphol, 
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The group of individuals who engage in non-tax protest through the tax 
system also includes those pressing claims for reparations for slavery.  While 
the reparations tax credit is generally viewed as a scam,39 there are individuals 
who maintain that they claim the credit in order to protest the treatment of 
African-Americans in the United States.40  In addition, during the nineteenth 
century, women suffragists refused to pay taxes in order to protest their 
inability to vote, metaphorically invoking the “no taxation without 
representation” slogan from the Boston Tea Party.41 
2. Protesting Tax Discrimination 
Other individuals acknowledge the legitimacy of the tax laws, but protest 
their application to a specific group.42  They seek to highlight and to remedy 
wrongful discrimination codified in the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) by 
Congress.43  The story of Robert Mueller is the story of just such a tax 
protester—which is precisely why I asked your indulgence in allowing me to 
explain why, in this case, you should not immediately associate a pejorative 
connotation with this label.  With this background (and hopefully with an open 
and untainted mind), we can now proceed to consider the story of the tax trials 
and tribulations (and incarceration) of Robert Mueller, “a homosexual.”44 
II.  “A [THE] HOMOSEXUAL” 
From 1975 until 1982, Robert Mueller was “in a traditional heterosexual 
marriage which allowed the filing of joint returns and other benefits.”45  After 
that marriage ended in divorce, Mueller “decided to stop hiding his 
 
Tax Statement: Some War Protesters Withhold Payments to IRS, HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 13, 
2003, at A1. 
 39.  E.g., William P. Brown & Richard D. Adams, Tax Fraud and Tax Protesters, 33 TAX 
ADVISER 790, 790 (2002); Justice Department Files Suit to Stop Slave Reparations Scams; IRS 
Warns Blacks to Beware, JET, Mar. 25, 2002, at 19, 19; Scam Alert!, ESSENCE, Aug. 2002, at 88, 
88. 
 40.  See Michelle Boorstein, Va. Man, Daughter Get Prison for Slavery Tax Claim, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 24, 2003, at A10. 
 41.  Carolyn C. Jones, Dollars and Selves: Women’s Tax Criticism and Resistance in the 
1870s, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 265, 268–69, 275–88. 
 42. See Kornhauser, Taxing Conscience, supra note 14, passim; Garrity, supra note 33, 
passim. 
 43. Garrity, supra note 33, passim. 
 44.  United States v. Mueller, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,205, at 87,342 (7th Cir. 
2000).  Mueller is apparently not alone in making this type of protest.  See Tammye Nash, 
Lesbian Tells Tax Man to Take a Hike, GAY FIN. NETWORK, at http://www.gfn.com/archives/ 
story.phtml?sid=933 (last modified Mar. 22, 1999). 
 45.  Petitioner’s Brief at 4, Mueller v. Comm’r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1887 (2000) (No. 15289-
98).  
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homosexuality.”46  A few years later, angered by the fact that he could not 
receive the same tax benefits in a same-sex relationship as he could while 
married to his wife,47 Mueller ceased filing tax returns and paying taxes as a 
protest against being limited to filing a tax return as “single,” no matter what 
his actual relationship status.48  In 1989, Mueller entered into a relationship 
with Todd Bates that continued throughout the remaining years of this tax 
protest.49 
Mueller continued his protest for a decade; he did not file a tax return 
again until 1996.50  During this period, Mueller worked “as a computer 
programmer/consultant for various companies and hospitals,”51 earning a 
relatively comfortable living.52  In 1996, the IRS finally caught up with 
Mueller and charged him with three counts of willful failure to file an income 
 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  There are a number of tax benefits and detriments associated with marriage.  See 
Knauer, supra note 4, at 160 (“an estimated 60 provisions on the income tax side alone” refer to a 
taxpayer’s marital status).  Among the benefits are the ability to transfer property between 
spouses without triggering income, estate, or gift tax, I.R.C. §§ 1041, 2056, 2523 (West 2004), 
and the ability to split income between the spouses for income tax purposes, id. § 6013 (i.e., to 
obtain what is colloquially referred to as a marriage “bonus,” see infra note 89).  Among the 
disadvantages are the marriage “penalty,” see infra note 89, and the inability to obtain beneficial 
results from transactions between spouses, see, e.g., I.R.C. § 267 (West 2004) (disallowing losses 
incurred in transactions between related parties, including spouses); id. § 318(a)(1)(A)(i), (b) 
(cross-referencing id. §§ 302, 958(b), and 6038(d)(2)) (attributing the ownership of stock between 
family members, including spouses, for a number of purposes in the Code—including 
determining whether a redemption of stock will be treated as a distribution or exchange, whether 
the controlled foreign corporation regime will apply to a foreign corporation, and whether certain 
information must be furnished to the IRS with respect to a foreign corporation).  For a discussion 
of the oppressive nature of the federal treatment of same-sex couples, see Infanti, supra note 4, at 
779–804. 
 48.  Petitioner’s Brief at 4, Mueller (No. 15289-98). 
 49.  Id.  And this relationship appears to have been a difficult one in the sense that Bates 
(with Mueller’s help) appears to have battled a drug problem throughout much, if not all, of the 
period that the relationship continued.  See id. at 14.  At trial, Mueller indicated that he had 
suffered a theft loss during one of the years in which he did not file a tax return; Bates had 
apparently stolen Mueller’s television to feed his drug habit.  Transcript of Trial at 33–36, 
Mueller (No. 15289-98); see also Mueller, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1888 n.1. 
 50.  See Mueller, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1888; Mueller v. Comm’r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 764, 765 
(2001). 
 51.  Mueller, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1888. 
 52.  According to the notice of deficiency issued by the IRS, Mueller’s combined employee 
and non-employee compensation ranged from a low of $44,090 in 1986 to a high of $102,491 in 
1991.  Petition at sched. 2(b), Mueller (No. 15289-98).  On average, he earned approximately 
$84,500 each year during the decade that this portion of the protest continued.  Id. 
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tax return.53  In a trial before a magistrate judge in 1997, Mueller was 
convicted on all three counts “and sentenced to a total of 13 months’ 
imprisonment and one year of supervised release.”54 
A. Mueller I 
In 1998, the IRS then pursued Mueller for the taxes that he owed for the 
years 1986 through 1995.55  In its notice of deficiency, the IRS alleged that 
 
 53. See United States v. Mueller, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,205, at 87,342 (7th Cir. 
2000); Information, United States v. Mueller, 96-CR-243 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 1996) (indicting 
Mueller under I.R.C. § 7203 with respect to calendar years 1989 through 1991). 
  A few words are necessary to put Mueller’s criminal prosecution in perspective.  Over 
the past several decades, the number of federal criminal tax prosecutions has been on the decline.  
TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, NATIONAL PROFILE AND ENFORCEMENT 
TRENDS OVER TIME, at http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/newfindings/current/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2004) 
(“According to information collected separately by the Justice Department and the federal 
courts . . . , tax prosecutions have . . . continued their decades long downward slide, now totaling 
about half what they were a decade ago and one third what they were five years ago.”).  But see 
Amy Hamilton, IRS Refutes Figures Showing Less Prosecution of Tax Cheats, 99 TAX NOTES 
311 (2003) (noting that data provided by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse 
(“TRAC”) are widely cited, but also containing criticism of the TRAC data and analysis).  
According to a TRAC analysis of information provided by the federal courts, there were only 847 
federal tax prosecutions in 1996, the year of Mueller’s indictment.  TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS 
ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, NATIONAL PROFILE AND ENFORCEMENT TRENDS OVER TIME: TOTAL 
FEDERAL TAX PROSECUTIONS ACCORDING TO U.S. COURTS, at http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/trends/ 
v09/aousc.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2004).  According to a TRAC analysis of information 
provided by the U.S. Justice Department, there were 935 total federal tax prosecutions in 1996, 
with 855 of those prosecutions having resulted from IRS criminal referrals.  TRANSACTIONAL 
RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, NATIONAL PROFILE AND ENFORCEMENT TRENDS OVER 
TIME: TOTAL FEDERAL TAX PROSECUTIONS ACCORDING TO U.S. ATTORNEYS, at 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/trends/v09/title26fil.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2004).  Only 186 out of 
the 855 tax prosecutions that resulted from IRS criminal referrals had willful failure to file a tax 
return listed as the statutory lead charge.  TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, 
NATIONAL PROFILE AND ENFORCEMENT TRENDS OVER TIME: SPECIFIC STATUTORY LEAD 
CHARGE ON TAX PROSECUTIONS RESULTING FROM IRS CRIMINAL REFERRALS, at 
http://www.trac.syr.edu/tracirs/findings/national/taxprosDetailhtml (last visited Nov. 17, 2004).  
Thus, Mueller was one of a very small handful of non-filers prosecuted in 1996.  Apparently, 
Mueller had the opportunity to avoid jail time, but chose not to take that opportunity because he 
felt that bringing the issue of sexual orientation discrimination to the fore was too important.  See 
infra text accompanying note 118. 
 54.  Mueller, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,205, at 87,342.  In 1999, Mueller’s 
supervised release was revoked and he was ordered back to prison for an additional ninety days, 
because he had violated the terms of his supervised release by failing to file a U.S. federal income 
tax return for 1997.  Id. 
 55. Mueller, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1888. 
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Mueller owed more than $249,000 in taxes and over $69,000 in penalties56 
(with, of course, interest—compounded daily).57  Mueller promptly contested 
the asserted deficiency in Tax Court.58 
During the course of this first of two Tax Court cases in which he 
represented himself, Mueller made a general attack on the marital 
classifications in the Code.  Early on, he stated that his goal was to extend to 
the tax laws the definition of family set forth in Braschi v. Stahl Associates:59  
“A more realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of a family includes two 
adult lifetime partners whose relationship is long-term and characterized by an 
emotional and financial commitment and interdependence.”60 
So, when the IRS made a request for admissions inquiring about Mueller’s 
marital status, his relationship with Bates, and whether the two had applied for 
a marriage license from the state of Illinois, Mueller refused to respond to the 
request on the ground that 
he and the group he belongs to are denied the benefits of such a classification.  
Also, because of the U.S.’s stance on gay partners, the Petitioner was denied 
the sanction of marriage or a partnership, and, therefore, his status for the 
entire period in question cannot be judged by whether or not he was 
“married”.61 
As might be expected, the IRS did not take kindly to Mueller’s refusal to 
respond to its request for admissions; it filed a motion with the Tax Court to 
impose sanctions on Mueller.62  The Tax Court granted this motion and 
ordered Mueller’s response to the request for admissions stricken as a 
sanction.63  The court further ordered that all matters set forth in the IRS’ 
request for admissions would be deemed admitted by Mueller.64 
 
 56.  Id.  The deficiency appears to be attributable to Mueller’s having earned much of his 
income as an independent contractor and his subsequent failure to pay estimated income tax and 
self-employment tax on that income.  Petition at sched. 2(b), Mueller (No. 15289-98). 
 57.  I.R.C. §§ 6601, 6622 (West 2004).  Mueller was assessed a penalty for failure to file a 
return under § 6651(a)(1) as well as a penalty for underpayment of estimated taxes under § 
6654(a).  Mueller, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1890.  Interest on the penalty for failure to file a return 
accrues beginning on the date when the return was required to be filed.  I.R.C. § 6601(e)(2)(B) 
(West 2004).  Interest on the penalty for underpayment of estimated taxes only accrues from the 
date of the notice and demand therefore, and only if that penalty is not paid within twenty-one 
calendar days (reduced to ten calendar days under certain circumstances) from the date of the 
notice and demand.  Id. § 6601(e)(2)(A). 
 58.  Petitioner’s Brief at 4, Mueller (No. 15289-98). 
 59. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989). 
 60.  Petitioner’s Response to Request for Admission at 2, Mueller (No. 15289-98). 
 61.  Id. at 3. 
 62.  Respondent’s Motion to Impose Sanctions, Mueller (No. 15289-98). 
 63.  Order on Motion to Impose Sanctions, Mueller (No. 15289-98). 
 64.  Id. 
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Mueller did not fare any better at trial.  In the course of a very short trial,65 
most of which consisted of a give and take concerning the admissibility of 
exhibits into evidence,66 Judge Laro made it abundantly clear that he was not 
receptive to Mueller’s challenge to the tax laws.  He told Mueller that the 
“[c]ourt only interprets existing law,” and admonished him not to make 
arguments about changing the law “[b]ecause, frankly, it’s not anything I can 
relate to.”67 
Unsurprisingly, Judge Laro issued an opinion sustaining the IRS’ proposed 
deficiencies and penalties.68  In his opinion, Judge Laro immediately 
desexualized Mueller’s challenge to the Code’s discrimination against gay and 
lesbian couples: 
Petitioner’s sole claim in this case is that he should be accorded married, rather 
than single, filing status on his tax returns for the years 1989 to 1995.  
Petitioner does not claim to have ever been married.  Rather petitioner argues 
that he had an “economic partnership” with his roommate and that he was 
unconstitutionally denied the opportunity to file a joint tax return with him in 
recognition of such partnership.69 
The purposefulness of this desexualization was made clear later in the opinion 
when Judge Laro stated that “[p]etitioner claims discrimination not as a 
homosexual but as a person who shares assets and income with someone who 
is not his legal spouse.  Petitioner therefore places himself in a class that 
includes nonmarried couples of the opposite sex, family members, and 
friends.”70  Having desexualized the issue presented to the court, Judge Laro 
quite easily dismissed what he interpreted as a new gloss on an old equal 
protection challenge to the marital classifications in the Code.71 
While taking the gay issue off of the table may have made Judge Laro feel 
more comfortable and may have allowed him more easily to render his 
decision in favor of the IRS, Judge Laro engaged in a far less than charitable 
reading of the record in Mueller’s case.  In fact, the record is replete with 
references to the Code’s discriminatory treatment of gay and lesbian couples—
as well as to Mueller’s self-described “civil disobedience” to bring this issue to 
 
 65.  Transcript of Trial at 1, 44, Mueller (No. 15289-98) (indicating that the trial began at 
9:30 a.m. and concluded at 10:23 a.m.). 
 66.  Id. at 8–33. 
 67.  Id. at 41. 
 68.  Mueller, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1890. 
 69.  Id. at 1888 (emphasis added).  For a discussion of the general desexualization of gay 
and lesbian relationships in the federal tax context, see Infanti, supra note 4, at 783–88. 
 70.  Mueller, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1889. 
 71.  Id. at 1889–90. 
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light so that it might be addressed in the appropriate forum.72  In closing, Judge 
Laro made a nod to these references and told Mueller that if he wished to 
petition for redress of any discrimination in the Code against gays and lesbians, 
such a petition would have to be addressed to Congress: 
  While petitioner makes several arguments on policy and sociological 
grounds, in the face of the cases cited above to the contrary, they have no legal 
bearing on the issues in this case.  Whether policy considerations warrant 
narrowing of the gap between the tax treatment of married taxpayers and 
homosexual and other nonmarried economic partners is for Congress to 
determine in light of all the relevant legislative considerations.73 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Laro’s decision in an 
unpublished order.74  The Seventh Circuit reiterated its decision in previous 
cases that the marital classifications in the Code do not violate the 
Constitution,75 and it declined to address Mueller’s challenge to the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act76 (“DOMA”) because that law “was not in effect 
during the 10-year period for which Mueller was assessed deficiencies.”77  The 
Seventh Circuit also indicated that Mueller had not rebutted the presumption of 
correctness enjoyed by the IRS’ notice of deficiency; his evidence “discussing 
the status of homosexuals in various countries . . . did not establish that the 
Commissioner erred in computing the deficiencies.”78  The court concluded by 
stating that Mueller’s “testimony only reenforced the appropriateness of the 
deficiencies and additions because he admitted earning substantial income 
during the relevant tax years . . . but filing no returns.”79 
B. Mueller II 
 
 72.  Petitioner’s Brief at 15, Mueller  (No. 15289-98); e.g., Petitioner’s Response to Motion 
to Impose Sanction, Mueller (No. 15289-98) (indicating that Mueller felt that the courts, and not 
the legislature, were the appropriate place to challenge the treatment of gay and lesbian couples); 
Petitioner’s Response to Request for Admission, Mueller (No. 15289-98) (discussed in the text 
above); Transcript of Trial at 15–24, 28–33, Mueller (No. 15289-98) (attempting to introduce into 
evidence various exhibits  concerning the tax treatment of gay and lesbian couples); see  also 
Brief for Petitioner at 10, Mueller v. Comm’r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 764 (2001) (No. 4743-00) 
(discussing Judge Laro’s misinterpretation); Transcript of Trial at 25–26, Mueller (No. 4743-00) 
(same). 
 73.  Mueller, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1890. 
 74.  Mueller v. Comm’r, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,391 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) 
(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7). 
 77.  Mueller, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,391, at 87,901. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
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In 1996, Mueller changed his method of protest.  In that year, he did file a 
tax return—a return that he had completed jointly with his partner, Todd Bates.  
On the return, Mueller listed his name first and Bates’ name second, striking 
out the word “spouse” where it appeared in the label block of the return.80  
Mueller marked filing status 2 (“Married filing joint return”),81 but “struck out 
the word ‘Married’ on that line so that it read ‘filing joint return’ instead of 
‘Married filing joint return.’”82  Mueller claimed an exemption for a “spouse” 
on line 6b of the return, and claimed a standard deduction “based upon his 
claimed filing status of ‘filing joint return.’”83  Mueller also used the married 
filing jointly tax rate schedule.84  He had Bates sign the return on the line 
below his name, but again struck out the word “spouse” in the signature 
block.85 
In its notice of deficiency, the IRS asserted a deficiency of $8,712 in tax.86  
This deficiency was due to (i) the reclassification of certain wage income as 
self-employment income (with a resulting liability for self-employment tax), 
(ii) the determination that Mueller was only entitled to the standard deduction 
for singles, and (iii) the determination that Mueller was required to use the tax 
table for singles in computing his tax.87  Mueller’s tax had been reduced by 
filing jointly because Bates was unemployed in 1996.88  Had they been allowed 
to file a joint return, they would have benefited from a marriage “bonus,”89 
saving $1,897 in additional taxes.90 
 
 80.  Mueller v. Comm’r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 764, 765 (2001). 
 81.  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF TREASURY, FORM 1040: U.S. INDIVIDUAL 
INCOME TAX RETURN 1 (1996), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-96/f1040.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2004). 
 82.  Mueller, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) at 765. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Mueller, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) at 765.  Mueller was allowed the benefit of the claimed 
exemption for Bates; however, it was classified as a dependency exemption rather than a spousal 
exemption.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  As explained by Dorothy Brown: 
A marriage penalty occurs whenever a couple pays higher federal income taxes as a result 
of their marriage than they would pay if they remained single and filed individual returns.  
A marriage bonus occurs whenever a couple pays lower federal income taxes as a result 
of marriage than they would pay if they remained single and filed individual returns.  
Marriage penalties are the greatest where there are two wage earners; marriage bonuses 
are the greatest where there is only one wage earner. 
Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and White, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 787, 
787 (1997).  A leading treatise adds that: 
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Having learned from his prior experience in the Tax Court (where Judge 
Laro misconstrued the argument that he was making), Mueller was much more 
specific, careful, and direct in fashioning the question that he wished the court 
to address in this case.  In contesting the deficiency proposed by the IRS, 
Mueller made a direct challenge to the constitutionality of DOMA, which was 
in force during his 1996 taxable year and provided that: 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, 
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies 
of the United States, the word “marriage” means only a legal union between 
one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers 
only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.91 
Mueller challenged the constitutionality of DOMA on a number of grounds, 
including “equal protection, due process, separation of church and state, and 
the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.”92 
Mueller’s second Tax Court case was heard by Special Trial Judge Pajak, 
who, at least at trial, proved more sympathetic to Mueller’s cause than Judge 
Laro had been.  In fact, Judge Pajak told Mueller at trial, “I’m very 
sympathetic to your case.”93  Nevertheless, Judge Pajak ultimately sustained 
the IRS’ proposed deficiency.94  Judge Pajak’s thinking was foreshadowed by 
the comments that followed his statement at trial in support of Mueller’s cause: 
“I think there’s merit in it [i.e., Mueller’s case], but I think you’re in the wrong 
 
[B]ecause the rate brackets for a married couple filing jointly are less than twice as wide 
as those . . . for unmarried persons, many couples pay more taxes than they would if they 
could file as unmarried persons. These ‘marriage penalties’ are greatest for spouses whose 
incomes are equal and decline and eventually become ‘marriage bonuses’ as spouses’ 
incomes become more unequal. 
4A BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND 
GIFTS ¶ 111.3.2, S111-44 (2nd ed. Supp. 2004) (footnotes omitted).  To provide marriage penalty 
relief, Congress has increased the standard deduction and the 15% rate bracket for married 
taxpayers filing jointly to twice the size of the standard deduction and the 15% rate bracket of 
single individuals—but this relief is only in effect from 2003 through 2010.  Working Families 
Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, §§ 101(b)–(c), 105, 118 Stat. 1166, 1167–68, 1169; 
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, §§ 102, 103, 107, 
117 Stat. 752, 754–55; Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 
107-16, §§ 301, 302, 901, 115 Stat. 38, 53–54, 150. 
 90.  See Appellee’s Brief at 8, 20, Mueller v. Comm’r, 2002-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 
50,505 (2002) (No. 02-1189). 
 91.  Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) 
(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7). 
 92.  Appellee’s Brief at 9, 10, Mueller (No. 02-1189). 
 93.  Transcript of Trial at 12, Mueller (No. 4743-00). 
 94. Mueller, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) at 766. 
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forum.  This is a statutory court.  We can only do what the laws say we can 
do.”95 
As mentioned above, in an attempt to avoid the misconstruction of his 
arguments by a second Tax Court judge, Mueller had been more specific in 
fashioning the question that he wished the court to address.  But by solving one 
problem, Mueller had created another.  In his opinion, Judge Pajak held that 
DOMA was irrelevant to Mueller’s case.96  In 1996, no state recognized same-
sex marriage. As a result, Mueller was unable to marry Bates before the close 
of his 1996 taxable year.97  Because Mueller was not married to Bates at any 
time during 1996, DOMA’s redefinition of marriage as a union between a man 
and a woman “effect[ed] no change in the law otherwise applicable in this 
case.”98 
Then, completely ignoring the fact that he was actually incorporating 
DOMA-type discrimination into the Code by relying on state law to define 
“marriage,”99 Judge Pajak quickly concluded that Mueller’s federal tax filing 
status for 1996 was single, and he reaffirmed Judge Laro’s earlier conclusion 
 
 95.  Transcript of Trial at 12, Mueller (No. 4743-00); see also id. at 19 (“What the Court will 
tell you ultimately is that you’ll probably have to go to Congress, and there are congressman who 
are sympathetic to your position.”). 
 96. Mueller, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) at 765–66. 
 97. The determination whether a taxpayer is married is generally made at the close of the 
taxpayer’s taxable year.  I.R.C. § 7703(a)(1) (West 2004). 
 98.  Mueller, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) at 766. 
 99.  Absent the application of DOMA, whether a taxpayer is married for federal income tax 
purposes is determined under state law.  Boyter v. Comm’r, 668 F.2d 1382, 1385 (4th Cir. 1981) 
(“We agree with the government’s argument that under the Internal Revenue Code a federal court 
is bound by state law rather than federal law when attempting to construe marital status.”).  
During 1996, Mueller lived in Illinois and Washington.  Transcript of Trial at 34–35, Mueller 
(No. 4743-00).  During that year, Illinois enacted a statutory prohibition on same-sex marriage.  
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/212(a)(5) (2004) (effective May 24, 1996).  Although Washington did 
not enact its statutory prohibition on same-sex marriage until 1998, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
26.04.020(1)(c) (West Supp.), the Washington Court of Appeals had held more than two decades 
earlier that same-sex marriage is not authorized under the Washington marriage statutes.  Singer 
v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).  But see infra text accompanying notes 
190–94 for a discussion of recent developments in the State of Washington with regard to 
excluding same-sex couples from access to civil marriage.  In petitioning the Supreme Court for 
review of his case, Mueller noted this problem as well: 
Judge Pajak ruled that homosexuals in the United States can only use single or head of 
household status when it comes to taxation, while heterosexuals have several additional 
options.  Both the respondent and the Court cite the fact that the Petitioner was not 
married, knowing full well that such a status is not available to homosexuals.  The 
Petitioner states that because the status is not available, de facto discrimination is being 
used to support the decision. 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *3, Mueller v. Comm’r, 2002 WL 32135138 (No. 02-513). 
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that the marital classifications in the Code do not violate the Constitution.100  
Judge Pajak closed his discussion of Mueller’s challenge with the same advice 
that Judge Laro had given: 
In Mueller I, the Tax Court also observed that whether policy considerations 
warrant narrowing of the gap between the tax treatment of married taxpayers 
and homosexual and other nonmarried economic partners is for Congress to 
determine in light of all relevant legislative considerations.  We agree with all 
of these statements which answer petitioner’s pertinent contentions.101 
The Seventh Circuit again affirmed the Tax Court’s decision in an 
unpublished order.102  Like Judge Pajak, the Seventh Circuit decided that “the 
constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act [was] irrelevant” to Mueller’s 
case.103  Also like Judge Pajak, the Seventh Circuit then completely ignored its 
incorporation of DOMA-type discrimination into the Code when it held that 
Mueller’s federal tax filing status for 1996 was single.104  The Seventh Circuit 
concluded its order with the following warning: “We remind Mr. Mueller once 
again that despite his personal dissatisfaction with the current tax laws, he does 
not have license to ignore them.  We also warn Mr. Mueller that if he continues 
to file frivolous tax appeals, he faces the possibility of sanctions.”105 
III.  FRIVOLITY 
A. The “Force” of Etymology 
Frivolous?  The Seventh Circuit’s intent in choosing this rather harsh and 
derogatory label is unmistakable.106  Although the word “frivolous” enjoys 
more than one meaning,107 its meaning is clear when used as a legal term of 
art: “Lacking a legal basis or legal merit; not serious; not reasonably 
purposeful.”108  By ostensibly labeling Mueller’s arguments in both of his Tax 
 
 100.  Mueller, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) at 766. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Mueller v. Comm’r, 2002-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,505, at 85,113 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 103.  Id. at 85,112. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  And a choice it was—the IRS did not even mention the word “frivolous” once in its 
brief to the Seventh Circuit.  See Brief for Appellee, Mueller (No. 02-1189).  Furthermore, the 
docket for this appeal, which is available at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/dkt.htm (last visited July 
28, 2004), makes no mention of the IRS having filed a separate motion, as required by FED. R. 
APP. P. 38, requesting that sanctions be imposed on Mueller for having filed a frivolous appeal. 
 107.  See 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 556 (1961). 
 108.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 677 (7th ed. 1999); see, e.g., In re Gulevsky, 362 F.3d 961, 
964 (7th Cir. 2004) (“An appeal is frivolous when the appellant’s arguments are utterly meritless 
and have no conceivable chance of success.”); Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont’l Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 
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Court cases “frivolous,”109 the Seventh Circuit tainted Mueller’s protest in 
precisely the fashion that I assiduously tried to avoid at the outset of this 
essay.110  They branded Mueller as some sort of a crackpot whose arguments 
are not even worth considering.  This allowed the court to shove Mueller back 
into the closet and slam the door shut on him.  The sound of the slamming door 
can be heard in the threat to impose sanctions on Mueller111—a threat that 
effectively forecloses the possibility of any future challenges by Mueller to the 
constitutionality of the Code’s discrimination against gay and lesbian couples. 
The violent imagery of Mueller being shoved into the closet and having the 
door slammed shut on him is actually quite apposite here, because the word 
“frivolous” etymologically implies the application of force.112  It has been 
suggested that the word “frivolous” was probably borrowed from the Latin 
word frivolus (meaning silly, empty, or trifling).113  The Latin frivolus, in turn, 
is a diminutive of a lost adjective frivos (meaning broken or crumbled), which 
was derived from the verb friare (meaning to break, rub away, or crumble).114 
By labeling Mueller’s arguments “frivolous,” the Seventh Circuit applied 
force to those arguments, attempting to crumble them in their hands.115  At the 
 
928, 938 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (“An appeal is ‘frivolous’ when the result is foreordained by 
the lack of substance to the appellant’s arguments.”). 
 109.  Note that the word “appeals” in the last sentence of the quoted language in the text 
above is plural, the word “continues” in that same sentence gives the impression that the conduct 
is ongoing, and the words “once again” in the prior sentence make clear that the Seventh Circuit 
had Mueller’s prior appeal in mind when it wrote this passage.  Mueller, 2002-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) ¶ 50,505, at 85,112 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 110.  See supra Part I. 
 111.  See FED. R. APP. P. 38. 
 112.  For other applications of deconstructive etymological analysis, see JACQUES DERRIDA, 
ARCHIVE FEVER: A FREUDIAN IMPRESSION (Eric Prenowitz trans., 1995) (deconstructing the 
concept of archiving through an exploration of the etymology of the word “archive”); J. M. 
Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1613, 
1619–25 (1990) (deconstructing Justice Scalia’s and Justice Brennan’s opinions in Michael H. v. 
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), by exploring the etymological link between the words 
“tradition” (which Justice Scalia cites and relies upon in his opinion) and “betrayal” (which is 
what Justice Brennan essentially accuses Justice Scalia of doing to prior precedents)) [hereinafter 
Balkin, Tradition]. For a description of other deconstructionist techniques and their application to 
the law, see J. M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1986). 
 113.  THE BARNHART CONCISE DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 300 (Robert K. Barnhart ed., 
1995) [hereinafter BARNHART DICTIONARY]; ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, at 
http://www.etymonline.com (last visited Nov. 17, 2004) [hereinafter ONLINE DICTIONARY]. 
 114.  BARNHART DICTIONARY, supra note 113, at 300; ONLINE  DICTIONARY, supra note 
113.  
 115.  For a deconstruction of the hierarchical opposition of justified/unjustified force in law, 
see Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority,” in 
DECONSTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF  JUSTICE 3, 5–6, 13–14 (Drucilla Cornell et al. eds., 
Mary Quaintance trans., 1992). 
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same time, the court clearly attempted to break Mueller’s spirit, to discourage 
and dishearten him, to dissuade him from making future challenges to the 
constitutionality of the discrimination against gay and lesbian couples that 
Congress has embedded in the Code.  In applying this force to crumble and to 
break, the court attempted to rub away, to erase the specter of Mueller (both 
past and present) from their consciousness, because they did not want to be 
reminded of Mueller or of the arguments that he was making.  They justified 
this erasure—the effacing of their very discussion of Mueller’s case from the 
official public record116—by stating that his arguments were not even worth 
taking the time to consider.  But, despite the court’s best efforts, a trace of 
Mueller remains: a record where we can bear witness again to Mueller’s efforts 
to raise awareness of a wrong and to have that wrong rectified by the 
government that committed it. 
This application of force by the court is designed to banish gays and 
lesbians to the closet, to make them invisible, to silence them, which is by no 
means an anomaly in tax.  The open discomfort at dealing with gay and lesbian 
issues in the tax laws can also be seen in the actions of Congress and the IRS: 
In defining marriage for purposes of federal law, DOMA makes no explicit 
mention of gay and lesbian couples—even though its purpose is to brand them 
inferior.  Its condemnation of homosexuality comes instead by implication and 
through explanation in committee reports that few will ever read.  This 
discomfort at officially and prominently acknowledging the existence of gay 
and lesbian couples can also be detected in the noticeable failure of Congress 
and the IRS to address the application of the Code to gay and lesbian couples.  
It can additionally be detected in the need to shoe-horn gay and lesbian couples 
into desexualized tax categories (e.g., donor-donee, business partners, or 
employer-employee) at odds with the reality of their relationships.  
Relationships between gay men and lesbians are apparently so repugnant that 
they cannot be acknowledged as such; instead, they must either be ignored or 
reshaped into more acceptable, and less loathsome, molds.117 
A concerted, forcible silencing of gay and lesbian dissent manifests itself 
in the microcosm of Mueller’s case.  After I spent a day in the Tax Court 
public files room reading through the records of Mueller’s two Tax Court 
cases, I was able to see a common thread running through his submissions to 
 
 116.  Neither of the orders issued by the Seventh Circuit in Mueller’s appeals from the Tax 
Court were officially published.  The court issued both as “unpublished orders,” which means that 
they cannot be cited or used as precedent in the Seventh Circuit.  7TH CIR. R. 53; see also Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari at *i, Mueller v. Comm’r, 2002 WL 32135138 (No. 02-513) (“The Court of 
Appeals then applied rule 42(b) and (c) [sic] to suppress publication of the case and its 
decision.”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *i, Mueller v. Comm’r, 2001 WL 34115848 (No. 01-
44) (same). 
 117.  Infanti, supra note 4, at 802–03 (footnote omitted). 
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the court: Mueller felt that a wrong was being done to gays and lesbians, and 
he wanted to bring that wrong to the attention of the appropriate authorities so 
that it could be rectified.  Mueller had spent years publicly protesting the 
treatment of gay and lesbian couples under the Code—feeling so strongly 
about the issue that he was willing to spend thirteen months in prison 
so he could place these issues before the federal Courts [sic].  He could have 
had probation if he would just do as he was told, but he views this as a chance 
to help the next generation.  [He] believes the issues presented to the federal 
Courts [sic] to be valid Constitutional [sic] questions.  His civil disobedience 
was justified to serve as an opportunity for change, to present issues that need 
to be addressed to the forums that can address the issues.118 
In bringing this issue out into the open, Mueller was engaging in “protest” in 
the etymological sense of that word.  The verb “to protest” comes from the 
Latin protestari, which means to “declare publicly, testify, protest (pro- forth, 
before, pro- + testari testify, from testis witness).”119  Mueller was declaring 
publicly by testifying about the discrimination that he and others had suffered 
under the Code.  Yet, despite his plaintive testimony, Mueller was turned away 
(literally or figuratively) each time; he kept asking where he should go to press 
his case, but everyone’s answer seemed to be “not here.” 
Mueller had thought about going to Congress, but, given its overt hostility 
toward gay and lesbian couples,120 he knew that it would not be receptive to his 
arguments.121  He asked the IRS to recognize his relationship with Bates, but 
was told that if he wanted to be a test case he would need to get into the court 
system and seek change there.122  In his criminal tax case, Mueller pressed his 
claim that the discrimination against gays and lesbians in the Code violated a 
number of rights guaranteed to him by the U.S. Constitution.123  However, the 
Department of Justice attorneys who were prosecuting him argued that a 
criminal trial was not the appropriate forum for his protest; they contended that 
 
 118.  Petitioner’s Brief at 16, Mueller v. Comm’r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1887 (2000) (No. 15289-
98). 
 119.  BARNHART DICTIONARY, supra note 113, at 611; ONLINE DICTIONARY, supra note 113. 
 120.  The enactment of DOMA is a prime example of this hostility.  See Infanti, supra note 4, 
at 782. 
 121.  See, e.g., Trial Memorandum for Petitioner at 2–4, Mueller v. Comm’r, 82 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 764 (2001) (No. 4743-00); Brief for Petitioner at 7–9, Mueller (No. 4743-00); Petitioner’s 
Brief at 15, Mueller (No. 15289-98); Petitioner’s Response to Motion to Impose Sanction at 2, 
Mueller (No. 15289-98). 
 122.  See Transcript of Trial at 18–19, Mueller (No. 4743-00); Petitioner’s Response to 
Motion to Impose Sanction at attachment V, Mueller (No. 15289-98). 
 123.  Motion to Dismiss Indictment and to Declare 26 USC 7203 Unconstitutional as Applied 
to Defendant at 1–2, United States v. Mueller, No. 96-CR-243 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 1996). 
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Mueller should seek the relief that he desired in a civil tax case.124  When 
Mueller finally made it into the Tax Court, he was met with varying levels of 
receptivity to his arguments, but, in the end, Mueller was told by two different 
judges that civil court was not the right forum for his protest either and that he 
should petition Congress for redress—the same Congress that he had earlier 
concluded it would be pointless to approach.125  Then, to make sure that 
Mueller could in no way misunderstand his being rebuffed, the Seventh Circuit 
labeled his arguments frivolous and told him not to darken its door again.126 
Viewed from this perspective, Mueller’s story is both frustrating and 
depressing.  After reading through Mueller’s Tax Court files, I felt a cloud of 
despondency settle around me as I was sitting in the airport waiting for my 
flight home.  I could only imagine how discouraged and disheartened Mueller 
must have felt after engaging in this long and ultimately futile search for 
someone to hear his protest and to rectify the wrong that was being done to 
him and Bates—and every other gay and lesbian couple in the United States.  
Mueller’s story almost makes you feel as if all of the advances in gay rights 
over the past several decades—advances that have helped to move gay and 
lesbian issues out of the closet and into the light—have had no effect upon 
those who make, enforce, or interpret the federal tax laws. 
 
 124.  See Government’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 2–4, Mueller (No. 96-
CR-243); Transcript of Trial at 15–16, Mueller (No. 4743-00). 
 125. See supra Part II. 
 126. See supra Part II. 
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B. The Frivolity of “Frivolousness” 
Almost—but not quite.  This concerted application of force is, in fact, a 
reaction to these very  advances.  Without the advances and Mueller’s attempt 
at furthering them, there would be no need for a reactionary application of 
force.  Thus, once we recognize the force being applied against Mueller, we 
can see more clearly the two opposing forces at work in his case: a force 
attempting to effect change and a force attempting to resist change.  Through 
the simple expedient of this shift in context, we can begin to see Mueller’s 
story in an entirely different light.  No longer mired in a narrow, oppressive tax 
perspective,127 we can see Mueller’s struggle from a wider, more hopeful 
perspective that embraces the entire gay rights movement.128  Furthermore, in 
this different light, we will see the Seventh Circuit’s words turned on their 
head, revealing just how very frivolous the court’s attempt to disparage 
Mueller’s arguments was.129 
1. A Wider Perspective: Human Rights 
In his submissions, Mueller repeatedly claimed that the Code’s 
discriminatory treatment of gay and lesbian couples constitutes a violation of 
human rights.130  However, none of the courts that heard Mueller’s tax cases 
ever addressed this issue.  Nonetheless, we will briefly explore the treatment of 
sexual orientation discrimination as a human rights issue because it is an 
integral part of the progressive force that opposes and resists the reactionary 
force that Congress, the IRS, the Tax Court, and the Seventh Circuit all 
brought to bear against Mueller. 
a. European Court of Human Rights 
More than twenty years ago, the European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECHR”) began “[the] development of international human rights law in the 
 
 127. See supra note 4. 
 128. Mueller mentioned this wider perspective in his petitions to the Supreme Court for 
review of the Seventh Circuit’s decisions: “This is not a unique issue for the United States of 
America.  This is an issue that much of the world is starting to deal with.”  Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at *12, Mueller v. Comm’r, 2001 WL 32135138 (No. 02-513); see also Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari at *10, Mueller v. Comm’r, 2001 WL 34115848 (No. 01-44) (same). 
 129.  Mueller himself turned the Seventh Circuit’s words back on the government: “This law 
[DOMA] would be considered frivolous if it were not for the discrimination behind its 
enactment.”  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *12, Mueller, 2002 WL 32135138 (No. 02-513); 
see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *10, Mueller, 2001 WL 34115848 (No. 01-44) (same). 
 130.   Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *i, *4, *12, Mueller, 2002 WL 32135138 (No. 02-
513); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *i, *3, *10–11, Mueller, 2001 WL 34115848 (No. 01-44); 
Transcript of Trial at 8, 39, Mueller v. Comm’r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 764 (2001) (No. 4743-00); 
Petitioner’s Brief at 15, Mueller v. Comm’r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1887 (2000) (No. 15289-98). 
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area of gay and lesbian sexuality”131 by holding that Northern Ireland’s 
sodomy laws violated Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“Convention”).132  Article 8 of the 
Convention provides that “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private 
and family life, his home and his correspondence.”133  In the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, the ECHR reaffirmed its interpretation of Article 8 in finding that 
the sodomy laws of Ireland and Cyprus also violated the Convention.134 
Even though not all of the ECHR’s decisions over the past twenty years 
concerning sexual orientation and gender identity have been positive,135 
commentators have noted that, since the late 1990s, the ECHR has become 
“increasingly receptive to human rights claims brought by lesbian and gay 
applicants.”136  For example, the ECHR has held that: 
 Employing different ages of consent for heterosexual and homosexual 
relations violated Article 14 of the Convention (taken in conjunction 
with Article 8 of the Convention).137  Article 14 provides that “[t]he 
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention 
shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex . . . 
or other status.”138 
 The United Kingdom’s ban on gays and lesbians serving in the military 
violated Article 8 of the Convention.139 
 
 131.  Kristen L. Walker, Evolving Human Rights Norms Around Sexuality, 6 ILSA J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 343, 344 (2000). 
 132.  Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149 (1981). 
 133.  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 
1950, art. 8(1), 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 230. 
 134.  Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 485 (1993); Norris v. 
Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 186 (1988). 
 135.  Walker, supra note 131, at 344. 
 136.  Laurence R. Helfer, International Decision: Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal; 
A.D.T. v. United Kingdom, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 422, 422 (2001); see also Kristen Walker, 
Sexuality and Human Rights in Europe: An Update, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 169, 185 
(2000). 
 137.  B.B. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 53760/00 (2004), available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Judgments.htm (last visited July 28, 2004); L & V v. Austria, 36 
Eur. H.R. Rep. 55 (2003); SL v. Austria, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 39 (2003).  Each of these decisions 
relied upon Sutherland v. United Kingdom, an unreported 1997 decision of the European Human 
Rights Commission in which a violation of the Convention was found in the United Kingdom’s 
use of different ages of consent for heterosexual and homosexual relations.  See Walker, 
supra note 131, at 344 & n.5. 
 138.  Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 
133, art. 14, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232. 
 139.  Lustig-Prean v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 548 (1999); Smith & Grady v. 
United Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 493 (1999). 
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 A Portuguese appellate court violated Article 14 of the Convention 
(taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention) when it 
overturned a lower court ruling awarding custody of a young girl to her 
father because of his sexual orientation.140 
 The criminalization of homosexual relations between more than two 
men in private violated Article 8 of the Convention.141 
 The failure legally to recognize the reassigned sex of a post-operative 
transsexual violated Article 8 of the Convention.  The ECHR further 
held that the individual’s inability to marry someone of the sex 
opposite her reassigned sex violated Article 12 of the Convention,142 
which provides that “[m]en and women of marriageable age have the 
right to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws 
governing the exercise of this right.”143 
 An Austrian Supreme Court decision denying the surviving member of 
a same-sex couple the benefit of a rent law, which permitted surviving 
life companions to succeed to decedent companions’ tenancies, 
violated Article 14 of the Convention (taken in conjunction with 
Article 8).144 
b. U.N. Human Rights Committee 
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has on several occasions 
considered the application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (“ICCPR”) to sexual orientation discrimination.145  In 1994, the Human 
 
 140.  Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 47 (1999). 
 141.  ADT v. United Kingdom, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 33 (2001). 
 142.  Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18 (2002). 
 143.   Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 
133, art. 12, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232. 
 144.  Karner v. Austria, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 24 (2003). 
 145.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter ICCPR].  In contrast to the Convention, the United States is a party to the ICCPR.  
However, the United States ratified the ICCPR subject to a declaration that its operative 
provisions would not be self-executing, which effectively prevents an action from being brought 
under the ICCPR in U.S. courts until such time as implementing legislation is enacted.  138 
CONG. REC. 8068–71 (1992); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 111(3) & cmt. h (1987) (explaining the difference between self-executing and 
non-self-executing treaties); see, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 2763 (2004) 
(“Several times, indeed, the Senate has expressly declined to give the federal courts the task of 
interpreting and applying international human rights law, as when its ratification of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights declared that the substantive provisions of 
the document were not self-executing.”); Hain v. Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224, 1243 (10th Cir. 2002), 
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1173 (2003) (“it is clear that the ICCPR is not binding on the federal 
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Rights Committee found that Tasmania’s sodomy law violated the right of 
privacy embodied in Article 17 of the ICCPR.146  In that decision, the Human 
Rights Committee also noted that the references to “sex” in Articles 2 and 26 
of the ICCPR, which guarantee equal protection of the law without regard to 
status, include sexual orientation within their ambit.147  The Human Rights 
Committee later reaffirmed this interpretation of Article 26 of the ICCPR in 
another case brought against Australia.148  In that case, the Human Rights 
Committee held that Australia’s denial of pension benefits to the surviving 
same-sex partner of a veteran violated Article 26 where those same benefits 
would have been provided to the surviving opposite-sex partner of a veteran 
(whether or not the two had been married).149 
In a case brought against New Zealand, the Human Rights Committee held 
that the ICCPR does not obligate states that have ratified the treaty to extend 
the right to marry to same-sex couples.150  This interpretation was based on the 
language of Article 23(2) of the ICCPR, which guarantees “[t]he right of men 
and women of marriageable age to marry.”151  The Human Rights Committee 
noted that, in contrast to other provisions of the ICCPR, Article 23(2) “is the 
only substantive provision in the [ICCPR] which defines a right using the term 
‘men and women’, rather than ‘every human being’, ‘everyone’ and ‘all 
 
courts”); Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 10 n.1 (1st Cir. 1994) (per curiam), cert. 
denied, 514 U.S. 1049 (1995) (“Appellants’ contention that their right to vote in the presidential 
election is secured by Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights . . . is 
without merit.  Even if Article 25 could be read to imply such a right, Articles 1 through 27 of the 
Covenant were not self-executing . . . and could not therefore give rise to privately enforceable 
rights under United States law.”); Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 82, 86 & n.26 (2004) (“For several human rights 
treaties [including the ICCPR], the United States has accompanied its ratification with a 
declaration of non-self-executing character, thereby limiting the role of the domestic courts in 
treaty enforcement.”). 
  In addition, the United States has not ratified the optional protocol to the ICCPR that 
would allow the Human Rights Committee to accept individual complaints concerning U.S. 
compliance with the ICCPR.  See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302, 302 n.1 (entered into force on Mar. 23, 1976); 
OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS OF 
THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/ 
pdf/report.pdf (last modified June 9, 2004). 
 146.  Toonen v. Australia, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 488/1992, Doc. 
No. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992  (Apr. 4, 1994). 
 147.  Id. at ¶ 8.7. 
 148. Young v. Australia, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 941/2000, Doc. 
No. CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000 (Sept. 18, 2003). 
 149.  Id. at ¶ 12. 
 150.  Joslin v. New Zealand, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 902/1999, 
Doc. No. CCPR/C/75/D/902/1999 (July 30, 2002). 
 151.  ICCPR, supra note 145, art. 23(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 179. 
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persons’.”152  Two members of the committee wrote an opinion concurring in 
this interpretation of the ICCPR, but concomitantly issued the following 
warning: 
  As to the Committee’s unanimous view that it cannot find a violation of 
article 26, either, in the non-recognition as marriage of the same-sex 
relationships between the authors, we wish to add a few observations.  This 
conclusion should not be read as a general statement that differential treatment 
between married couples and same-sex couples not allowed under the law to 
marry would never amount to a violation of article 26.  On the contrary, the 
Committee’s jurisprudence supports the position that such differentiation may 
very well, depending on the circumstances of a concrete case, amount to 
prohibited discrimination. 
  Contrary to what was asserted by the State party, it is the established view 
of the Committee that the prohibition against discrimination on grounds of 
“sex” in article 26 comprises also discrimination based on sexual orientation.  
And when the Committee has held that certain differences in the treatment of 
married couples and unmarried heterosexual couples were based on reasonable 
and objective criteria and hence not discriminatory, the rationale of this 
approach was in the ability of the couples in question to choose whether to 
marry or not to marry, with all the entailing consequences.  No such possibility 
of choice exists for same-sex couples in countries where the law does not 
allow for same-sex marriage or other type of recognized same-sex partnership 
with consequences similar to or identical with those of marriage.  Therefore, a 
denial of certain rights or benefits to same-sex couples that are available to 
married couples may amount to discrimination prohibited under article 26, 
unless otherwise justified on reasonable and objective criteria.153 
2. A Wider Perspective: Constitutional Rights 
This “very strong international trend towards treating sexual orientation as 
a suspect classification under . . .  human rights treaties”154 has now begun to 
affect the decisions of U.S. courts.  In Lawrence v. Texas, more than twenty 
years after the ECHR decision in Dudgeon and some nine years after the 
Human Rights Committee’s decision in Toonen, the U.S. Supreme Court 
finally overruled Bowers v. Hardwick155 and struck down Texas’ sodomy law 
on the ground that it violated the right to liberty guaranteed by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.156  Notably, in 
 
 152.  Joslin, supra note 150, at ¶ 8.2. 
 153.  Id. at app. (citations and footnotes omitted). 
 154.  Robert Wintemute, The Massachusetts Same-Sex Marriage Case: Could Decisions from 
Canada, Europe, and South Africa Help the SJC?, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 505, 506 (2004). 
 155.  Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 156. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
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reaching its decision in Lawrence, the Supreme Court specifically referred to 
the ECHR and its decision in the Dudgeon case: 
  The sweeping references by Chief Justice Burger [in Bowers] to the history 
of Western civilization and to Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards did 
not take account of other authorities pointing in an opposite direction . . . . 
  Of even more importance, almost five years before Bowers was decided 
the European Court of Human Rights considered a case with parallels to 
Bowers and to today’s case.  An adult male resident in Northern Ireland 
alleged he was a practicing homosexual who desired to engage in consensual 
homosexual conduct.  The laws of Northern Ireland forbade him that right.  He 
alleged that he had been questioned, his home had been searched, and he 
feared criminal prosecution.  The court held that the laws proscribing the 
conduct were invalid under the European Convention on Human Rights.  
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom.  Authoritative in all countries that are members 
of the Council of Europe (21 nations then, 45 nations now), the decision is at 
odds with the premise in Bowers that the claim put forward was insubstantial 
in our Western civilization.157 
As Harold Hongju Koh has noted, “[d]espite nearly a half century of 
coexistence between the United States Supreme Court and the [ECHR], 
Lawrence was the first U.S. Supreme Court majority opinion ever to cite an 
ECHR judgment in the text of its opinion.”158  A few pages later, the Lawrence 
Court again referred to international human rights law: 
  To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider civilization, it 
should be noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers have been rejected 
elsewhere.  The European Court of Human Rights has followed not Bowers but 
its own decision in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom.  Other nations, too, have 
taken action consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of 
homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct.  See Brief for 
Mary Robinson et al. as Amici Curiae 11–12.  The right the petitioners seek in 
this case has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other 
countries.  There has been no showing that in this country the governmental 
interest in circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or 
urgent.159 
 
 157.  Id. at 572–73 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 158.  Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 50 
(2004); see also Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International Tribunals, and the Continuum of 
Deference: A Postscript on Lawrence v. Texas, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 913, 915 (2004) (in referring to 
the Lawrence case, stating that, “[f]or the first time in history, a majority of the Supreme Court 
has relied on an international tribunal decision to interpret individual liberties embodied in the 
U.S. Constitution”). 
 159.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576–77 (citations omitted). 
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In this passage, the Court cited the pages in Mary Robinson’s amicus brief that 
refer to the Human Rights Committee’s 1994 decision in Toonen (finding that 
Tasmania’s sodomy law violated Article 17 of the ICCPR) and to the action 
taken by Australia to implement the Committee’s decision.160 
Several years before Lawrence, the Supreme Court had already eroded the 
force of Bowers when it decided Romer v. Evans.161  In Romer, the Court 
struck down an anti-gay amendment to the Colorado Constitution (commonly 
referred to as “Amendment 2”) on the ground that it violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.162  Amendment 2 prohibited “all 
legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of state or local government 
designed to protect . . . gays and lesbians.”163  The Court found that Colorado 
had “classified homosexuals . . . to make them unequal to everyone else,” 
essentially rendering gays and lesbians “stranger[s] to its laws.”164  The Court 
held that Amendment 2 could not even withstand the lenient rational basis test: 
First, the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and 
undifferentiated disability on a single named group, an exceptional and, as we 
shall explain, invalid form of legislation.  Second, its sheer breadth is so 
discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems 
inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a 
rational relationship to legitimate state interests.165 
3. A Wider Perspective: The States and Same-Sex Marriage 
In the wake of Romer and Lawrence, many opponents of same-sex 
marriage now fear (and many proponents of same-sex marriage now hope) that 
one of the Court’s next steps in the gay rights area will be to strike down 
prohibitions against same-sex marriage on constitutional grounds.166  Over the 
past decade, there has been movement among the several states toward 
recognizing the fact that same-sex couples in the United States are not afforded 
the same possibility of recognition through marriage as are heterosexual 
couples.  This movement has primarily taken place in state courts167 and has 
 
 160.  See Koh, supra note 158, at 50 & n.49; Neuman, supra note 145, at 89–90 & nn.40–41. 
 161.  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 162.  Id. at 623. 
 163.  Id. at 624. 
 164.  Id. at 635. 
 165.  Id. at 632. 
 166.  See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586–605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Richard Lessner, Judicial Tyranny, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2003, at B4; William Safire, The 
Bedroom Door, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2003, at A21; Cheryl Wetzstein, Gay “Marriages” Ahead: 
Debate Stirs in the States, WASH. TIMES, July 13, 2003, at A1. 
 167.  Exceptions include California and New Jersey, which have both enacted domestic 
partnership registries.  Beginning January 1, 2005, the rights and benefits of marriage are being 
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resulted in a patchwork of different types (and levels) of recognition for same-
sex couples.168 
The movement began in 1993 with the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision 
in Baehr v. Lewin.169  In that case, a plurality of the court found that Hawaii’s 
marriage laws discriminated on the basis of sex by limiting the issuance of 
marriage licenses to opposite-sex couples.170  The court held this 
discrimination to be a presumptive violation of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Hawaii Constitution—a presumption that the state could rebut only by 
showing that (i) the sex-based classification in the statute was justified by a 
compelling state interest, and (ii) “the statute is narrowly drawn to avoid 
unnecessary abridgments of . . . constitutional rights.”171  After a hearing on 
remand, the trial court found that the state could not meet this heavy burden 
and, therefore, held that Hawaii’s marriage laws violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Hawaii Constitution.172 
While an appeal was pending before the Hawaii Supreme Court, the state 
constitution was amended in 1998 to empower the state legislature to limit 
marriage to opposite-sex couples.173  In December 1999, the Hawaii Supreme 
Court took judicial notice of this constitutional amendment, and held that the 
amendment validated Hawaii’s marriage laws “by taking the statute out of the 
ambit of the equal protection clause of the Hawaii Constitution, at least insofar 
as the statute, both on its face and as applied, purported to limit access to the 
marital status to opposite-sex couples.”174  It is worth noting that even though 
 
extended to California domestic partners.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West Supp. 2004).  It is 
worth noting that the New Jersey Domestic Partnership Act, 2003 N.J. Laws 246, N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 26:8A-1 (2004), which does not provide the full panoply of rights and benefits accorded 
to married couples, see Editorial, Still Not First Class Citizens, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), 
July 8, 2004, at 18, was enacted while a court challenge to the New Jersey marriage laws was 
pending.  See Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Brief at 3–4, 45 n.10, Lewis v. Harris, No. A-2244-3T5 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. May 6, 2004), http://www.lambdalegal.org/binary-data/LAMBDA_PDF/ 
pdf/281.pdf (last visited July 28, 2004).  The New Jersey Domestic Partnership Act went into 
effect on July 10, 2004.  Peggy O’Crowley, Gay Pairs Set to Party as Domestic Partners, STAR-
LEDGER (Newark, N.J.),  July 9, 2004, at 17; Katie Wang, United They Stand, Under New Law: 
Up to 700 Same-Sex Jersey Couples Register as Domestic Partners on Act’s First Day, STAR-
LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), July 11, 2004, at 23. 
 168.  For a description of the difficult planning issues that arise as a result of this patchwork, 
see Jill Schachner Chanen, The Changing Face of Gay Legal Issues, A.B.A. J., July 2004, at 46, 
46–51. 
 169.  Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
 170.  Id. at 64–67. 
 171.  Id. at 67. 
 172.  Baehr v. Miike, CIV No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at * 22 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 
1996). 
 173.  HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23. 
 174.  Baehr v. Miike, No. 20371, 1999 Haw. LEXIS 391, at *6 (Haw. Dec. 9, 1999). 
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same-sex marriages were never legalized in Hawaii, the state legislature did 
pass a law allowing any two persons legally prohibited from marrying 
(including, but not limited to, same-sex couples) to register as “reciprocal 
beneficiaries,” a status that allows the pair to obtain a limited number of rights 
and benefits accorded to married couples under Hawaii law.175 
Similarly, in 1998 an Alaska trial court held that “marriage, i.e., the 
recognition of one’s choice of a life partner, is a fundamental right.”176  In the 
court’s view, limiting the issuance of marriage licenses to opposite-sex couples 
thus raised the specter of a violation of both the right to privacy and the right to 
equal protection of the law found in the Alaska Constitution.177  Accordingly, 
the trial court held that the state would be required to show a compelling 
interest justifying the abridgment of these constitutionally protected rights.178  
However, before a hearing could be held to determine whether the state could 
make this showing, the Alaska Constitution was amended to limit marriage to 
opposite-sex couples.179 
In 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court held that the exclusion of same-sex 
couples from the rights and benefits attendant to marriage violated the 
Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution.180  This clause provides 
“[t]hat government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, 
protection, and security of the people, nation, or community, and not for the 
particular emolument or advantage of any single person, family, or set of 
persons, who are a part only of that community.”181  Because the court held 
only that “plaintiffs are entitled under Chapter I, Article 7, of the Vermont 
Constitution to obtain the same benefits and protections afforded by Vermont 
law to married opposite-sex couples,” it left open to the state legislature the 
choice of affording same-sex couples either the right to marry or some other 
recognition of their relationships that would offer them the benefits and 
protections afforded to married couples.182  In the end, the Vermont legislature 
 
 175.  1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 383.  Like the amendment to the Hawaii Constitution, this law 
was passed while the Baehr case was pending and was an effort to “derail[]” that case.  Susan 
Essoyan, Hawaii’s Domestic-Partner Law a Bust; Ambiguity Blamed, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1997, 
at A5; see also Bettina Boxall, A New Era Set to Begin in Benefits for Gay Couples, L.A. TIMES, 
July 7, 1997, at A3. 
 176.  Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, at *1 
(Alaska Super. Feb. 27, 1998). 
 177.  Id. at *3–*6. 
 178.  Id. at *6. 
 179.  ALASKA CONST. art. I, §§ 25.05.011–013. 
 180.  Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 877–86 (Vt. 1999). 
 181.  VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 7. 
 182.  Baker, 744 A.2d at 886–87. 
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chose to enact a civil union law that affords same-sex couples all of the 
benefits and protections associated with marriage.183 
In 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that excluding 
same-sex couples from access to civil marriage violates both the due process 
and equal protection guarantees in the Massachusetts Constitution.184  To 
remedy this violation, the court reformulated “civil marriage to mean the 
voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to the exclusion of all others.  This 
reformulation redresse[d] the plaintiffs’ constitutional injury and further[ed] 
the aim of marriage to promote stable, exclusive relationships.”185  The court 
then stayed its judgment for 180 days “to permit the Legislature to take such 
action as it may deem appropriate in light of [the court’s] opinion.”186 
During this 180-day period, the Massachusetts Senate submitted a question 
to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, asking it whether the enactment 
of a law prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying but allowing them to 
form civil unions would satisfy the constitutional concerns raised by the court 
in its opinion.187  The court answered that it would not: 
  The same defects of rationality evident in the marriage ban considered in 
Goodridge are evident in, if not exaggerated by, Senate No. 2175.  Segregating 
same-sex unions from opposite-sex unions cannot possibly be held rationally 
to advance or “preserve” what we stated in Goodridge were the 
Commonwealth’s legitimate interests in procreation, child rearing, and the 
conservation of resources.  Because the proposed law by its express terms 
forbids same-sex couples entry into civil marriage, it continues to relegate 
same-sex couples to a different status.  The holding in Goodridge, by which 
we are bound, is that group classifications based on unsupportable distinctions, 
such as that embodied in the proposed bill, are invalid under the Massachusetts 
Constitution.  The history of our nation has demonstrated that separate is 
seldom, if ever, equal.188 
On May 17, 2004, the first same-sex couples were legally married in 
Massachusetts.189 
More recently, two Superior Court judges in the State of Washington have 
ruled that excluding same-sex couples from access to civil marriage violates 
the Washington Constitution.  The first of these two cases was decided in 
August 2004 by a judge in King County, which embraces the City of Seattle.  
 
 183.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2004). 
 184.  Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 960–68 (Mass. 2003). 
 185.  Id. at 969. 
 186.  Id. at 970. 
 187.  Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 566 (Mass. 2004). 
 188.  Id. at 569 (citation omitted). 
 189.  Pam Belluck, Hundreds of Same-Sex Couples Wed in Massachusetts: Advocates Hail a 
Triumph for Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2004, at A1. 
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In that decision, it was held that the Washington Defense of Marriage Act190 
violates both the Privileges and Immunities and Due Process Clauses of the 
Washington Constitution.191  The second case was decided a month later by a 
judge in Thurston County, which embraces the City of Olympia.  In that 
decision, it was likewise held that the Washington Defense of Marriage Act 
violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Washington 
Constitution;192 however, the judge in that case went further and held that 
“homosexuals in the context of state action, in authorizing civil contracts 
between adult citizens, constitutes [sic] a suspect class under the state 
constitution calling for a higher level of scrutiny than merely finding a rational 
basis to justify the action.”193  Neither of these cases has yet resulted in the 
issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples, because “both cases will be 
merged and likely heard before the state Supreme Court.”194 
4. The Unbounded Text 
As Jacques Derrida has stated, “il n’y a pas de hors-texte.”195  This 
statement, which has been translated as “[t]here is nothing outside of the 
text,”196 means that relevant interpretational context is boundless.197  In 
pondering Mueller’s story, it is toward this boundlessness that we have 
naturally been led.  By recognizing and tracing the outlines of the force behind 
the words of the Seventh Circuit, we have been able to leave behind a 
bounded, myopic view of the text of Mueller’s civil tax cases and to move 
instead toward an unbounded view that infuses the Seventh Circuit’s words 
with new meaning. 
The Seventh Circuit warned Mueller that “if he continues to file frivolous 
tax appeals, he faces the possibility of sanctions.”198  These “frivolous” 
 
 190. See supra note 99. 
 191. Andersen v. King County, No. 04-2-04964-4 SEA, slip op. at 22 (Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 
4, 2004), available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/news/local/gaymarriage/ 
downing_opinion.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
 192. Castle v. Washington, No. 04-2-00614-4, slip op. at 36–37 (Wash. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 
2004), available at http://www.co.thurston.wa.us/superior (click on “Recent Opinions”) (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
 193. Id. slip op. at 25–26. 
 194. Lornet Turnbull, Gays Are Protected Class, State Judge Says, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 8, 
2004, at A1. 
 195.  JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 158 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans., 
1997). 
 196.  Id.  Literally, this statement is translated as “there is no outside-text.”  Id. 
 197.  See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Deconstruction, Structuralism, Antisemitism and the 
Law, 36 B.C. L. REV. 1, 17 (1994). 
 198.  Mueller v. Comm’r, 2002-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,505, at 85,112 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(emphasis added). 
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arguments challenged the sexual orientation discrimination that had been 
tacitly present in the Code for decades until Congress made its discriminatory 
intent explicit in 1996 by enacting DOMA.199  But how frivolous do these 
arguments really seem when we consider them against the background of the 
expanded horizon sketched above? 
Both the ECHR and the Human Rights Committee have strong records of 
acknowledging and rectifying sexual orientation discrimination as a human 
rights matter.200  Importantly, a number of these decisions directly address the 
issue of according legal recognition to same-sex couples.201  In Romer and 
Lawrence, the U.S. Supreme Court also acknowledged and rectified sexual 
orientation discrimination as a constitutional matter.202  In Lawrence, the Court 
even referred, explicitly or implicitly, to decisions of the ECHR and the 
Human Rights Committee in reaching its own decision.203  In the wake of 
Lawrence, many opponents of same-sex marriage now fear (and many 
proponents of same-sex marriage now hope) that one of the Court’s next steps 
in the gay rights area will be to strike down prohibitions against same-sex 
marriage.204  These fears (and hopes) are stoked by the growing recognition 
that excluding same-sex couples from the benefits and protections associated 
with marriage is unjustified and unjustifiable.205  Court decisions in Hawaii, 
 
 199.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *7, Mueller v. Comm’r, 2001 WL 32135138 (No. 02-
513) (“Congress felt bold enough to codify discrimination against homosexuals in 1996 with the 
Defense of Marriage Act.  The discrimination has been present for many years, but it has seldom 
been so openly demonstrated as in 1996.”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *6, Mueller v. 
Comm’r, 2001 WL 34115848 (No. 01-44) (same); see also Infanti, supra note 4, at 780–83 
(describing this move from latent to patent hostility). 
 200.  See supra Part III.B.1. 
 201.  E.g., Karner v. Austria, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 24 (2003) (affording benefits of rent law to 
surviving member of a same-sex couple); Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18 
(2002) (affording recognition to the reassigned sex of a transsexual); Young v. Australia, U.N. 
Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 941/2000, Doc. No. CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000 ¶ 10.4 
(Sept. 18, 2003) (affording pension benefits to surviving member of a same-sex couple); Joslin v. 
New Zealand, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 902/1999, Doc. No. 
CCPR/C/75/D/902/1999 ¶ 8.3, app. (July 30, 2002) (holding that the ICCPR does not require a 
state party to extend the right to marry to same-sex couples, but stating, in a concurring opinion, 
that this holding does not mean that differential treatment of same-sex couples cannot constitute a 
violation of the ICCPR). 
 202.  See supra Part III.B.2. 
 203.  See supra Part III.B.2. 
 204.  See supra note 166. 
 205.  Polls show that a majority of Americans “support equal access to the specific 
obligations, responsibilities and recognitions of marriage.” NAT’L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK 
FORCE, Recent National Polls on Same-Sex Marriage and Civil Unions 1 (2004), 
http://www.thetaskforce.org/marriage center/RecentNationalMarch2004.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 
2004). 
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Alaska, Vermont, Massachusetts, and Washington have all found that 
prohibitions against same-sex marriage violate their state constitutions.206  To 
rectify this discrimination, Hawaii permits same-sex couples to register as 
reciprocal beneficiaries, Vermont allows same-sex couples to enter into civil 
unions, and Massachusetts permits same-sex couples to marry.207  In addition, 
the California and New Jersey legislatures have each enacted statutes allowing 
same-sex couples to register as domestic partners.208 
These decisions and developments, many of which occurred before the 
Seventh Circuit issued either of its opinions in Mueller’s civil tax cases, 
undermine the Seventh Circuit’s bald assertion that Mueller’s arguments were 
“frivolous.”  With courts at the international, national, and state levels 
recognizing and rectifying instances of what can only be described as 
pervasive sexual orientation discrimination, how can it be meritless to ask a 
court to recognize and rectify the sexual orientation discrimination that exists 
in the federal tax laws?  Obviously, like the court in Bowers, the judges on the 
Seventh Circuit (and, for that matter, in the Tax Court) chose to turn a blind 
eye to the world around them.  To paraphrase the Supreme Court in Lawrence, 
these numerous decisions and developments in gay rights over more than two 
decades are at odds with the Seventh Circuit’s premise that the claims put 
forward by Mueller were insubstantial.209 
Once we abandon the court’s bounded, myopic view of Mueller’s tax cases 
in favor of a more realistic, unbounded view that allows us to see Mueller and 
his arguments in a broader context, it becomes clear that the Seventh Circuit’s 
assertion about the meritoriousness of Mueller’s arguments was itself without 
merit.  Suddenly, this serious threat seems rather silly and groundless.  In other 
words, it appears that it was the Seventh Circuit (and not Mueller) who was 
making frivolous arguments in this case (arguments that were frivolous in all 
senses of the word).  Even if the Seventh Circuit’s assertion were somehow 
considered plausible when made in June 2002, that plausibility has been 
severely eroded (if not completely washed away) by the additional judicial 
developments that have occurred since that time. 
C. Facing a Choice 
Having recognized the vapidity of the Seventh Circuit’s epithet/threat, 
where does that leave us?  Has this deconstructionist meditation merely killed 
some time with interesting word play at the expense of some judges in Illinois?  
Or is there a larger meaning to what we are contemplating here that is 
 
 206. See supra Part III.B.3. 
 207. See supra Part III.B.3. 
 208.  See supra note 167. 
 209.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572–73 (2003). 
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somehow redolent of the themes of openness and freedom suggested by the 
title of this symposium?210 
Between May 17, 2004, and the end of the calendar year, hundreds of 
same-sex couples will have been married in Massachusetts.  Although these 
marriages will be legally recognized for Massachusetts state law purposes, 
DOMA prevents them from being recognized at the federal level.211  Most of 
the same-sex couples who get married in Massachusetts will probably not 
 
 210.  As Vivian Curran and J. M. Balkin have both explained, the application of 
deconstructive techniques to a text is not a random occurrence.  Curran states that 
Derrida has made clear that deconstruction is applied in response to textual components: 
“[Deconstruction is an] incision, precisely [because] it can be made only according to 
lines of force and forces of rupture that are localizable in the discourse to be 
deconstructed.”  Moreover, in his keynote speech at the 1990 “Deconstruction and the 
Possibility of Justice” colloquium at Cardozo Law School, Derrida again made clear that 
the deconstructionist exploration of meaning through hierarchy reversal is not imposed 
randomly, but, rather, on those word combinations whose juxtapositions draw the 
attention of the deconstructionist to the likelihood of rich interpretive possibilities. 
Curran, supra note 197, at 21 (quoting JACQUES DERRIDA, POSITIONS 37, 41 (Alan Bass trans., 
1981)) (citations omitted).  Balkin agrees that “[w]e deconstruct a particular text because we think 
that the text has a particular form of richness that speaks to us, either for good or for ill,” and, in 
considering why one deconstructs Plato or Saussure but not a laundry list or the back of a cereal 
box, he further asserts that “in each case, one deconstructs because one has a particular ax to 
grind, whether it be a philosophical, ideological, moral, or political ax.”  Balkin, Tradition, supra 
note 112, at 1626–27; see also J. M. Balkin, Being Just with Deconstruction, 3 SOC. & LEGAL 
STUD. 393, 399 (1994) (“So the target of deconstruction, and the way that the particular 
deconstructive argument is wielded, may vary with the moral and political commitments of the 
deconstructor.”); J. M. Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice, 92 MICH. 
L. REV. 1131, 1138 (1994) (“I shall argue that Derrida’s encounter with justice really shows that 
deconstructive argument is a species of rhetoric, which can be used for different purposes 
depending upon the moral and political commitments of the deconstructor.”); J. M. Balkin, 
Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal Coherence, 
103 YALE L.J. 105, 124–27 & n. 34 (1993) (“One could engage in deconstruction of a legal text 
without the desire to offer a normative alternative, or without a belief that the difficulties one 
found in the text were due to failures of substantive rationality . . . . However, the deconstruction 
practiced by legal critics is almost always rational deconstruction, because it seeks to criticize law 
on the basis of some proposed normative alternative.” (citation omitted)). Derrida has spoken to 
this issue as well: “Taking a position in philosophy: nothing ‘shocks’ me less, of course.  Why 
engage in a work of deconstruction, rather than leave things the way they are, etc.?  Nothing here, 
without a ‘show of force’ somewhere.  Deconstruction, I have insisted is not neutral.  It 
intervenes.”  Positions: Interview with Jean-Louis Houdebine and Guy Scarpetta, in JACQUES 
DERRIDA, POSITIONS 37, 93 (Alan Bass trans., 1981); see also DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY, 
supra note 195, at 161–64 (explaining his “exorbitant” choice of certain of Rousseau’s texts for 
deconstruction). 
 211.   Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) 
(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996)).  DOMA also permits other states to refuse to recognize these 
marriages.  Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (codified 
at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996)). 
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encounter the practicalities of this difference in treatment until some time 
between January 1 and April 15, 2005, when they sit down to complete a U.S. 
federal income tax return.212  As the first epigraph to this essay indicates, the 
IRS has recently reaffirmed its adherence to the holding in Mueller’s civil tax 
cases, stating that “[a] taxpayer in [a same-sex marriage] may not claim the 
status of a married person on the federal income tax return.”213 
Thus, each of these married same-sex couples will be faced with an 
unavoidable choice.  On the one hand, they can choose to be intimidated by a 
show of reactionary force, to file separate returns on which they check the 
“single” box, to follow the “law” as interpreted by the Seventh Circuit and the 
IRS, and, ultimately, to remain locked in the darkness of the tax closet.  On the 
other hand, they can choose to dismiss the empty threats, to follow Mueller’s 
example by filing joint returns, to risk the negative repercussions that may 
follow, and, ultimately, to attempt to kick the tax closet door wide open and 
finally let in the light.  Squarely pointed in the direction of the next front in the 
battle for gay rights, these couples can either retreat into darkness or stand and 
fight in the light—the choice will soon be theirs. 
 
 
 212.  Because Massachusetts has resisted allowing nonresidents to marry, it is unlikely that 
the question of interstate recognition of a Massachusetts same-sex marriage under DOMA and the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause will arise in more than a handful of cases in the near future.  Jessica 
Bennett, P-Town Follows Order, for Now, BOSTON GLOBE, May 27, 2004, at B2; Michel H. 
Hodges, Gay Wedding Bells Ring—In Canada, DETROIT NEWS, June 2, 2004, at 1D.  A number 
of out-of-state couples have, however, filed lawsuits challenging the validity of the law upon 
which the state’s resistance is based.  Pam Belluck, Eight Diverse Gay Couples Join to Fight 
Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2004, at A22; Elizabeth Mehren, Couples, Officials Target 
Marriage Law, L.A.TIMES, June 18, 2004, at A18. 
 213.  See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
